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Cutting Deals in Smoke-Filled A Rooms:
A Case Study in Public Choice Theory
BY DAVID S. SAMFORD*
"The Senate, in its unique way, has not reached a consensus here."'
A SENATE VOTE:
THE PREDICTABLE LEGISLATIVE OUTCOME
At 9:30 a.m. on June 17, 1998, the United States Senate was
/ called to order by Senator Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.), the
L president pro tempore, and the business of the day commenced
after a brief prayer offered by Dr. D. James Kennedy. The Senate had
debated Senate Bill 1415 for two weeks with numerous amendments
offered. Rhetoric inthe anterooms of the Capitol andupon the Senate floor
revolved around protecting children, the intrinsic value of individual
freedom, the scourge of hidden taxes and economic redistribution, and the
necessity of following the exacting legislative procedures of the august
body. Amidst the calls for compromise, forces on both sides of the debate
stiffened their resolve to either pass or defeat the landmark legislation. Yet
in the end, the ultimate fate of the legislation hinged upon a procedural rule
formally adopted decades earlier.'
Senators opposed to the settlement were filibustering, and so long as
they controlled the Senate floor, no action on the bill could be taken. A
motion invoking cloture was made.3 A vote for cloture would end the
* J.D. expected 2000, University of Kentucky. The author wishes to thank
Professor Richard Ausness for his assistance in this project as well as the author's
parents for their continued love and support.
1144 CONG. REC. S6475 (daily ed. June 17,1998) (statement of Senate Majority
Leader Trent Lott (R-Miss.), eulogizing the landmark tobacco legislation that was
about to be defeated upon the Senate floor).
'See id.
I See S. Rule XXII, 2.
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filibuster, thus ensuring a vote on final passage.4 The vote taken on June
17, 1998, strictly speaking was not a vote on the merits, but in every other
sense, it was to be the only expression of the legislators' attitude on the
tobacco controversy. Without a vote on final passage, there would be no
national tobacco settlement and the status quo of intense litigation and
regulatory skirmishes would continue to reign. Almost a year to the day
after the major tobacco companies entered into a historic settlement
agreement with an anti-tobacco coalition of state attorneys general, health
organizations, and trial lawyers-the legislative outcome was still
uncertain.5 The presiding officer announced the vote, "The question is, Is
it the sense of the Senate that debate on the committee substitute amend-
ment to S. 1415, the Universal Tobacco Settlement Act, shall be brought
to a close?" 6 Fifty-seven senators voted for the cloture motion, and forty-
two senators voted against the cloture motion.' Though attaining an
outright majority, the pro-settlement legislators failed to achieve the super-
majority necessary to invoke cloture and break the filibuster.' Quietly, with
the fall of the gavel, the proposed national tobacco settlement crumbled
under its own weight.
The failure of Congress to pass comprehensive tobacco legislation is
the predictable outcome under a doctrine of analysis known as public
choice theory. Part I of this Note examines the context, concepts, princi-
ples, and parties upon which public choice theory is founded.9 Part II
applies the theory to the negotiations and legislative maneuvering which
surrounded the national tobacco settlement and ultimately led to its de-
feat.10 Part III surveys the individual tobacco settlements that were reached
in Mississippi, Florida, Texas, and Minnesota and contrasts those suc-
cesses with the national failure.11 Finally, Part IV offers conclusions as to
the accuracy of the public choice theory in predicting legislative out-
comes and looks forward to the next step in the ongoing national tobacco
debate.
12
4 See id.
5See Barry Meier, Impact on Health: Hazy, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1997, at Al.
6 144 CONG. REc. S6479 (daily ed. June 17, 1998) (statement of Senator Strom
Thurmond (R-S.C.)).
7 See id.
' See S. RULE XXII, 2 (stating that successful motions for cloture require
three-fifths of the senators to vote in favor of ending the debate).
9 See infra notes 13-112 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 113-292 and accompanying text.
"See infra notes 293-357 and accompanying text.
12See infra notes 358-67 and accompanying text.
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I. PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY
The public choice theory has been characterized as "the economic
study of nonmarket decision making, or simply the application of
economics to political science."'3 Public choice theory has been regarded
as possessing an essentially pessimistic or cynical perspective' 4-creating
an unfavorable impression of the legislative process. Though pervasive, the
pessimism surrounding public choice theory should not discount its utility
as a model against which circumstances may be applied in an effort to
successfully predict legislative outcomes. In this predictive role, public
choice theory is in fact a positive theory. s
A. The Context and Philosophy ofPublic Choice Theory
Because many of the concepts incorporated into public choice theory
are derived from economic theory, the accuracy ofanypublic choice model
will necessarily be tempered by "the extent [to which] the individual
participant, in the market relationship, is guided by economic interest."' 6
In other words, "the average individual, when confronted with real choice
in exchange, will choose 'more' rather than 'less.' ,
17
1. The Context ofPublic Choice Theory
Public choice theory is the descriptive model of interest group
interaction." Though public choice theory was not institutionally recog-
nized until the latter half of the twentieth century, 9 the processes underly-
ing it are evident throughout American history. 0 As the greatly respected
13 DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II, at 1 (1989).
14 See WILLIAM C. MITCHELL, PUBLIC CHOICE IN AMERICA 195 (1971).
'" See generally MUELLER, supra note 13; Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey,
The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEx. L. REv. 873 (1987) (arguing that
public choice theory is a positive theory due to its predictions of future events
rather than explanations of what has occurred).
16 JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT:
LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 17 (1974).
17Id. at 18.
18 See MITCHELL, supra note 14, at 117-22.
'9 See MUELLER, supra note 13, at 2.
20Mueller traces the intellectual origins of public choice theory to "the stream
of political philosophy extending at least from Thomas Hobbes and Benedict
1998-99]
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political scientist V.0. Key, Jr., asserted, "group interests are the animating
forces in the political process; an understanding of American politics
requires a knowledge of the chief interests and of their stake in public
policy."2 ProfessorDahl tookthe next logical step by observing that "there
is a high probability that an active and legitimate group in the population
can make itself heard effectively at some crucial stage in the process of
decision." Though we shall soon observe the principles under which
Dahl's observation is validated, it is enough now to recognize the context
under which public choice theory has developed.23
2. The Philosophy ofPublic Choice Theory
With the preceding discussion as background, one should find it easier
to understand, and thus more likely to appreciate, the uniqueness of the
national tobacco settlement. As the Buchanan and Tullock model postu-
lates,24 the pursuit of self-interest was the driving force in the negotiations
and maneuvers leading up to and surrounding the cloture vote. While the
tobacco settlement ultimately didnot pass, itsjourney through the corridors
of power illustrates the essential nature of public choice theory and affirms
one's faith in the legislative process. While falling well short of endorsing
the Oliver Stone representation that "greed is good,"' public choice
theorists recognize the necessity of individual actors pursuing self-interest
in order to maintain an equilibrium within the public policy marketplace.26
As has been noted, "[t]he pursuit of self-interest in politics is both worthy
Spinoza, and within political science from James Madison and Alexis de
Tocqueville." Id. Professors Binidey and Moos examined the historical origins of
interest groups in the United States and cited the National Association of Cotton
Manufacturers (1854) and the National Grange (1867) as leading examples of early
special interest groups. See WILFRED E. BINKLEY & MALCOLM C. MOOS, A
GRAMMAR OF AMERICAN POLITICS 154 (1949). Their formation in the era
immediately before and after the Civil War supports Professor Key's assertion that
interest groups are the backbone of the political process. See V.0. KEY, JR.,
POLITICS, PARTIES, & PRESSURE GROUPS 17 (1964). See generally Geoffrey P.
Miller, Public Choice at the Dawn ofthe Special Interest State: The Story ofButter
and Margarine, 77 CAL. L. REV. 83 (1989).
2 KEy, supra note 20, at 17.
22 ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 145 (1956).
2 See infra notes 235-49 and accompanying text.
24See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
2 WALL STREET (Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 1987).26See MITCHELL, supra note 14, at 239.
[VOL. 87
PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY
and necessary-worthy because it is consistent with democratic values;
necessary, because it provides the motive power to make democracy
work.... We should honor political self-interest as we obviously honor
consumer sovereignty in the market."27 This assertion can be summarized
simply by saying "the normal system has the virtues of its vices."'2 8
B. The Necessary Parties and Underlying Principles ofPublic Choice
Theory
The elements of public choice theory have existed in the American
political structure since before the theory was adequately developed or
even articulated.29 Philosophically, public choice theory is decidedly
favorable to those comfortable in the tumult of an active public policy
market. The essence of public choice theory, however, is more aptly
described in the context of the parties upon which it depends and the
principles by which those parties operate.
1. The Necessary Parties ofPublic Choice Theory
The fundamental process of public choice theory is the interaction of
parties seeking beneficial legislative outcomes. The parties are traditionally
characterized as either interest groups or policy makers and must necessar-
ily conform to the laws of supply and demand.3° The demand side of the
market is represented by interest groups acting as consumers of public
policy." Policy makers, therefore, represent the supply side of the public
policy market.32 For the purposes of this discussion, we shall only concern
I71d. But see Farber & Frickey, supra note 15, at 906-14.
DAHL, supra note 22, at 150.
29 See MUELLER, supra note 13, at 1-2.
30 See MICHAEL T. HAYES, LOBBYISTS AND LEGISLATORS: A THEORY OF
POLITICAL MARKETS 18 (1981).
31 See id.
32 See ALAN PEACOCK, PUBLIC CHOICE ANALYSIS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
13 (1992). Professor Peacock has identified three markets within the political
system. First, he describes "'primary political market[s]"' as those where
"politicians sell policies for votes." Id. A second political market is the "'policy
supply' market in which bureaucrats will offer alternative administrative packages
to promote the policy aims of elected governments." Id. Finally, there is the
"'policy execution' market." Id. This market is primarily concerned with the
implementation of various policies and their effects upon various constituencies.
Each of these markets is a natural by-product of the separation of powers doctrine
1998-991
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ourselves with elected policy makers (i.e., Congress, state legislatures, and
governors).
a. Interest Groups
In his seminal study of collective action, Mancur Olson began by
stating that the purpose of all organizations is "the furtherance of the
interests of their members." 33 The negative implication is that "organiza-
tions often perish if they do nothing to further the interests of their
members, and this factor must severely limit the number of organizations
that fail to serve their members."'34 Thus, the maximization of self-interest
is and must be the primary purpose of every organization.35
The effectiveness of a special interest organization is often a paradoxi-
cal function of its effectiveness and efficiency. While an organization
becomes more effective as it becomes larger, the increased effectiveness
often comes at the expense of sustained efficiency.3 6 The need of large
organizations to administer themselves gives rise to more complex
organizational structures and power allocations. 37 While small organiza-
tions are typically very efficient, they may be unable to marshal the
resources needed to undertake a major, policy-affecting effort.38 The
balance between efficiency and effectiveness is illusive to many organiza-
tions lacking the proper formula to use their influence most beneficially. 39
embodied in the Constitution. Whereas the supply side of Peacock's primary
political market is dominated by the legislative branch, the supply side of both the
policy supply market and the policy execution market are functions of the civil
service and elected wings of the executive branch respectively. See id. For our
purposes, only the primary political market is of significant concern.
3 3 MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 5 (1965).
34 Id. at6.
31 See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text. But see MARK IRVING
LICHBACH, THE COOPERATOR'SDILEMMA 7 (1996). Professor Lichbach articulates
the dissenting view that there are organizations which do not act rationally and
often act contrary to the good of their members. Some common examples of such
groups include terrorists and social extremists. These "kamikaze participants" are
irrelevant in the tobacco context. Id.
36 See OLSON, supra note 33, at 48.
37 See id. at 46-48.
3
1 See id. at 43. -
39 See id. at 127. As Olson notes, "[s]ince relatively small groups will frequently
be able voluntarily to organize and act in support of their common interests, and
since large groups normally will not be able to do so, the outcome of the political
[VOL. 87
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Organizations able to maintain this equilibrium will often receive a
disproportionate share of any public policy benefits.'
Smaller groups are more effective, generally speaking, because they
have fewer transaction costs and free-rider problems." Transaction costs
are the expenses, both tangible and intangible, that an interest group must
bear simply to exist as an interest group.42 This rule has been stated
succinctly: "[C]osts of organization are an increasing function of the
number of individuals in the group."43 As the number of parties in a
bargaining process increases, "the costs of decision-making for the
individual participant will continue to increase, probably at an increasing
rate." An interest group faces a free-rider problem when it provides a
benefit that others may enjoy even if they did not share any of the burden
of providing the benefit.45 Small, "highly concentrated" interest groups are
best suited to overcome the free-rider problem." A large interest group is,
in effect, a prisoner of the scope of its interest.47
struggle among the various groups in society will not be symmetrical." Id.
I See MUELLER, supra note 13, at 453.
41 See OLSON, supra note 33, at 28, 53.
42 See id. at 46-47. Some of these costs include "costs of communication among
group members, the costs of any bargaining among them, and the costs of creating,
staffing, and maintaining any formal group organization." Id. at 47.
43Id. at46.
44 BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 16, at 106.
41 See OLSON, supra note 33, at 55. Olson uses the familiar example of a
disenchanted shareholder in a corporation. It would be virtually pointless for a
single shareholder with only a few shares to seek replacement of the corporation's
ineffective management. Such an effort would require vast resources. Even if the
single shareholder succeeded, every shareholder who had not contributed to the
effort would reap the benefits of the new management team. See id. Therefore, the
free-rider is the single shareholder who does nothing because he feels "his own
efforts will not have a noticeable effect on the situation of his organization, and he
can enjoy any improvements brought about by others whether or not he has worked
in support of his organization." Id. at 16; see also HAYES, supra note 30, at 42.
" See HAYES, supra note 30, at 50.
41 See OLSON, supra note 33, at 48. Olson identifies three specific problems
facing a potential large special interest group. First, "the larger the group, the
smaller the fraction of the total group benefit any person acting inthe group interest
receives." Id. Second, "the smaller the share of the total benefit going to any
individual ... the less the likelihood that any.., single individual, will gain
enough from getting the collective good to bear the burden of providing even a
small amount of it."Id. Finally, "the larger the number of members inthe group the
... higher the hurdle that must be jumped before any of the collective good at all
1998-991
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These problems maybe circumvented, at least in part, by the formation
of a coalition of interest groups-an "organization of organizations. ' 48
Coalitions may greatly increase the bargaining position and influence of
what would otherwise be diffuse and statistically irrelevant smaller interest
groups.49 According to Professor Wilson, coalitions are most likely to form
whenever the "resources and autonomy for all prospective members can be
significantly threatened (a crisis) or enhanced (an opportunity). '50
Coalitions will not form if the prospective members are competing for the
benefit of the same public policy objective. The constant struggle within a
coalition to achieve a comparative advantage over other coalition members
suggests that coalitions are often short-lived.51
A final characteristic of special interest groups is their effectiveness
within political markets. 2 "Issue movement" is the process by which an
organization increases its effectiveness in proportion to its size and scope. 3
While issues do seem to "move" in terms of public priority, public choice
theory is predicated on the assumption that interest groups remain
committed to their singular purpose long enough to become established and
actually change public opinion on an issue.m
can be obtained." Id.
48 JAMES Q. WILSON, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONs 267 (1973) (arguing that "[a]
coalition... is an ongoing mechanism for explicitly coordinating some or all of the
actions of the members").
49 See MITCHELL, supra note 14, at 224.
50 WILSON, supra note 48, at 275.
51 See id. at 263-64, 268, 271.
52See HAYES, supra note 30, at 137-38.
3 See id. Hayes adopts the work of previous commentators who suggest that
there are three issue categories: "nondecision, symbolic, and material politics." Id.
at 137. As an interest group grows, it progresses through a pattern of issue
movement,
beginning with the politics of nondecision, in which established groups
suppress efforts at change on the part of the unorganized. In time, these
challenging groups gain strength, forcing the established groups to make at
least symbolic concessions. Eventually, in the phase of material politics, the
reforming groups win out, and the previously entrenched groups in turn
seek symbolic reassurances that their status will be eroded no further.
Id. at 137-38 (citation omitted). Hayes points out that issues can "cease to move at
any point," depending on the success of other groups in "blocking demands for
material concessions." Id. at 138.
m See id. at 137-38.
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b. Policy Makers
While interest groups comprise the demand side of the political market,
policy makers represent the supply side.55 Generally speaking, the
overarching goal of elected policy makers is to get reelected.56 This
objective forces policy makers to consider all official actions in the context
of how they will be perceived "back home."57 There are, of course, many
ways in which policy makers go about the process of getting reelected.
Policy makers are likely to advertise in order to create public aware-
ness of the work being carried on by the legislator.58 The nature of political
advertising in the television age guarantees that such messages will be short
in substance but loaded with symbolism.5 9 A second method by which
policy makers seek to maximize their reelection is by "credit-claiming." 60
Here, a policy maker attempts to "generate a belief in [constituents] that
one is personally responsible for causing the government . ..to do
something that the [constituent] considers desirable." '61 Finally, policy
makers engage in "position taking" when they announce a declaration of
their position on a given subject calculated to be important to various
constituencies.62 In taking a position, policy makers weigh the electoral
effects of taking the particular position and the intensity by which the
position may be supported or opposed.63
55 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
56 See DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 36-38
(1974).
57 See id.
59 See id. at 49.
59 See generally KAREN S. JOHNSON-CARTEE & GARY A. COPELAND, INSIDE
POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS 8-9 (1997).
6o See MAYHEW, supra note 56, at 52.
61 Id. at 52-53.
62 See id. at 61.
63 See MITCHELL, supra note 14, at 203. For instance, an issue which is strongly
supported or strongly opposed by constituents is more likely to be strongly
supported or strongly opposed by a policy maker. If support is weak, few policy
makers will take a bold position. Where the constituents are sharply divided and
both sides are strong in their support, policy makers are likely to "obfuscate the
issue and one's position by appearing to support all sides" or to avoid the issue by
side-tracking it in committee or becoming unavailable for comment. Id. Where
there is division of opinion, but one side feels much more strongly, a policy maker
will often support that side or refuse to take a position. The great assumption
underlying this analysis is that the policy maker has no preconceived opinions on
1998-991
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The point to bear in mind, however, is that the term "constituents"
refers to more than individual voters. Interest groups are important
constituents and policy makers disregard them to their peril.
It must be emphasized that the average voter has only the haziest
awareness of what an incumbent congressman is actually doing in office.
But an incumbent has to be concerned about actors who do form
impressions about him, and especially about actors who can marshal
resources other than their own votes.6
The "actors" to whom Mayhew refers are interest groups." Under this
analysis, no policy maker would undertake a course of action that would
endanger his or her support among key interest groups without first
carefully deliberating upon the electoral repercussions. The policy-making
process thus creates "a number of specifiable and predictable policy
effects"-an "assembly coherence."6Thepractical effect ofthese influences
on policy creation is to strengthen the institutional traditions of the
legislative branch. This institutionalism creates yet another constituency for
a policy maker-his peers.67
Public choice theory has consistently focused upon the interaction
between special interests and legislative policy makers. Little attention has
the issue. See id. In regard to taking no position, Calvin Coolidge once said, "The
things I never say never get me into trouble." PAUL JOHNSON, A HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE 716 (1997).
64 MAYHEW, supra note 56, at 40 (citation omitted).
65See id.
Id. at 125. Mayhew asserts that there is an element of "delay" in the policy-
making process. See id. at 126. Essentially, policy makers are slow to act until they
have determined to their satisfaction the effects of a particular course of action.
Secondly, there is the tendency towards "particularism" where policy makers can
point with specificity to the fruits of their labor (i.e., capital projects, grants, or
government contracts). See id. at 127. In common parlance, this is known as "pork-
barrel politics." Thirdly, Mayhew suggests that policy makers tend to service the
needs of the organized interest groups as opposed to those of the unorganized. See
id. at 130. This assertion was illustrated in the national tobacco settlement by the
exclusion of smokers and growers from the initial negotiations. See infra Part II.
Finally, policy makers are likely to engage in symbolic acts designed to "express[ ]
an attitude but proscribe[ ] no policy effects." MAYHEW, supra note 56, at 132.
Each of these effects upon the legislative process benefits policy makers by
strengthening their public policy supply position relative to the demand side of the
political market67See MAYHEW, supra note 56, at 146-47.
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been focused upon the president as a supplier ofpublic policy except in the
"policy execution market."6' While varying in content from administration
to administration, the development stylistically of public policy can be
characterized in one of four ways.69 A strong president facing a weak
Congress is likely to result in "executive dominance" in the development
of public policy.70 Where both the president and the congressional majority
are of the same party, they are likely to engage in "joint program
development" with both sides actively engaged in the process.7 Where
Congress possesses more political capitalthanthe president, "congressional
development" of public policy will likely ensue. Finally, where the
government is divided with each party controlling one branch, policy
development is often caught in a "stalemate. '1' 3
2. The Underlying Principles ofPublic Choice Theory
Since public choice theory is essentially "the application of economics
to political science," it follows that several of the same principles apply to
both fields of study.7' Because interest groups will seek to maximize their
self-interest, they must often compete against other similarly situated
interest groups for scarce resources.75 In the public choice/tobacco
settlement context, the resource most coveted is a favorable governmental
policy-a framework of ground rules-by which interest groups may then
conduct their routine business and make strategic organizational decisions.
As in economics, this competition for scarce resources gives rise to
supply and demand patterns in interest group interaction with policy
makers. 6 The fierce competition resulting from this interaction is therefore
expected and, to a certain degree, encouraged. As in the economic
marketplace, a coherent set of ground rules is established. For instance:
[Organizations] that oppose one another typically do not compete with
one another .... [T]hey rarely, if ever, compete with one another for
68 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
69 See RANDALL B. PPLEY, CONGRESS: PROCESS AND POLICY 24 (1975).
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 25.
73Id.
74 MUELLER, supra note 13, at 1.
See WILSON, supra note 48, at 261.
76 See HAYES, supra note 30, at 18; see also MUELLER, supra note 13, at 334;
supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
1998-991
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
members and funds from the same list of prospects. Where competition
does exist, it is in part because the two [organizations] are not in
opposition with respect to their objectives and therefore appeal to similar
or identical contributors."7
Furthermore, the competition between interest groups over public policy
is good in that it preserves the equilibrium of the marketplace.7" As interest
groups seek to increase their relative influence-or in the case of tobacco,
their most attractive policy options-they develop long-term strategies and
form strategic coalitions.7 9
Bearing in mind that the maximization of self-interest is the only
sustaining factor of interest groups,80 that the ultimate policies for which
they compete are limited,81 and that interest groups must compete with one
another for these policies, 2 it is readily apparent that interest groups must
interact with other groups.8 3 Once the interactions begin, several additional
dynamics operate to further influence the eventual outcome of legislation. 4
7 WILSON, supra note 48, at 263-64.
71 See OLSON, supra note 33, at 111. Professor Olson suggests that the "counter-
balancing" effect of interest group competition prevents any one interest group
from dominating the policy process. See id.
71 See MITCHELL, supra note 14, at 224.8oSee supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
81 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
82See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
13 See WILSON, supra note 48, at 282. Wilson states that there are two funda-
mental types of ways in which organizations interact with each other. They will
either confront and adversarially compete against one another as "protest" groups
or they will negotiate with one another as "bargaining" groups. See id. Wilson
points out that it is not at all unusual for an organization to assume both stances in
an ongoing series of interactions. See id.
84 See id. at284-88. Wilson surveys the motivations of interest group interaction
and reduces them to three factors: "the nature of the issue, the social position of the
organization members, and the incentive system of the organizations." Id. at 284.
From this, he extrapolates the major dynamics contributing to the overall
effectiveness of interest group interaction. First, it is important for interest groups
to agree at least to the terms of the debate-essentially agreeing to what issues are
disputed. See id. Secondly, "[b]argaining is facilitated when the matter at issue is
divisible-that is, when it is a matter of 'more or less' rather than 'all or nothing."'
Id. at 285. This divisibility of issues allows interest groups to separate issues that
deeply divide them from those which they may readily agree. The third dynamic
is the social structure of the interest groups. See id. Organizations with an
"ongoing" relationship or a keen sense of "self-conception" are more likely to
[VOL. 87
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The bargaining process is only successful when allthe parties involved
are engaged in a "mutually beneficial exchange."8 Unless the parties
believe they have something to gain from the transaction, there is no
incentive for them to participate and the market fails.86 Assuming that
parties are willingto negotiate for amutuallybeneficial exchange, theywill
then seek to maximize the benefit they derive from the exchange.87 In a
coalition setting, this objective often creates a situation described as the
"prisoner's dilemma," wherein interest groups will act in what is their own
best interest-even if it is not always the optimal result.88 The "prisoner's
bargain with one another. See id. Fourth, interest groups will often take into
account the costs of protesting as opposed to the benefits derived from bargaining.
See id. at 286. If bargaining offers only marginal benefits, an organization will be
more inclined to adopt protest tactics. The converse is also true. Fifth,
"[o]rganizations that haveresources that are valued by their opponents will be more
likely to bargain than organizations lacking such resources." Id. at 287. Sixth,
organizations create an institutional history and may find it rewarding to remain
consistent with the tactics employed in previous disputes. "[I]nterest groups will
continue to engage in either protest tactics or negotiations if they find that those
efforts are rewarded. Conversely, if the presently employed tactics are
unsuccessful, there is great incentive to chart a new course." Id. These "rewards"
are effective in that they help define the boundaries of an organization's bargaining
power. See id. Finally, and most importantly to Wilson, a party is most likely to
succeed at bargaining when the demands they seek are legitimate. Without facing
a legitimate claim, other parties are often less inclined to negotiate bargains. See
id. at 288.
85 MITCHELL, supra note 14, at 122. Mitchell begins with the proposition that
each party must have "something of value with which to bargain or trade." Id.
From this starting position, the parties may negotiate until they reach an agreement
of exchange which benefits both parties. Mitchell explains that "[b]oth bargainers
may gain from an exchange but the gains are certainly not always equal .... Each
bargainer wants to cooperate just enough to conclude a bargain but each wants to
do as well as he can."Id. at 122-23. Furthermore, in the political context, the actual
negotiations may be conducted in private and are therefore less rigid and more
difficult to enforce. See id. at 123. This dynamic was both a blessing and a curse
to the national tobacco settlement negotiators. While both coalitions stood to
benefit from a bargain, the more publicity the proposed settlement drew, the more
difficult it was to conclude the bargain. See CARRICK MOLLENKAMP ET AL., THE
PEOPLE VS. BIG TOBACCO 72 (1998)
86 See MITCHELL, supra note 14, at 122.
87 See id. at 137.
88 See LICHBACH, supra note 35, at 247-48. A detailed explanation of the
"prisoner's dilemma" is summarized by Professor Lichbach:
The police take two suspects into custody. The district attorney is certain
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dilemma" dynamic was an ongoing problem for both coalitions in the
national tobacco settlement negotiations. 9
An added level of complexity is presented by the "cycling" scenario."
In the majority of negotiated public policy exchanges, there are multiple
parties involved. The cycling process prevents any two parties from
that they are guilty but does not have enough evidence to convict them of
the particular crime. He or she thus separates the suspects and offers each
the following deal: each prisoner may choose to confess or not to confess;
if neither confesses, then the district attorney will convict them on a minor
charge related to the crime and each will be sentenced for two years; if both
confess, then the district attorney will prosecute but recommend a lenient
sentence of eight years each; if one confesses and the other does not, then
the confessor will get only one year (for turning state's evidence) while the
one who does not confess will get ten years (for obstructing justice).
The mutually beneficial outcome is for both not to confess and receive
two years each. However, if one prisoner believes that the other will
confess, then he or she will confess in order to receive eight rather than ten
years; if one prisoner believes that the other will not confess, then he or she
will confess in order to receive one rather than two years. Therefore, each
prisoner is better off confessing regardless of what he or she believes the
other will do.
Id.
9See infra Part II.B.2.
See MUELLER, supra note 13, at 63. Mueller imagines a situation where three
individuals (A, B, and C) must decide how to allocate $100 amongst themselves,
and he assumes a majority rule scenario.A andB agree to a 60/40 split respectively.
At this point, C approaches B and agrees to a 50/50 split. A has a lot to lose, so he
approaches C and offers a 55/45 split, and so on. A is willing to receive less than
half to avoid receiving nothing. The cycling continues until a majority is reached
agreeing to split the proceeds 50/50. See id.; see also LICHBACH, supra note 35, at
31. Lichbach conducts a similar analysis under the guise of "game theory." See id.
Lichbach explains, "Game theory... studies interdependent and nonseparable
rather than independent and autonomous decision making." Id. Borrowing from
previous commentators, Lichbach observes,
"Broadly speaking, game theory may be seen as a tool-indeed as the
tool-for the simultaneous handling of three sets of interdependencies that
pervade social life. (1) The reward of each depends on the reward of all,
through envy, altruism, etc. (2) The reward of each depends on the action
of all, through general social causality. (3) The action of each depends on
the action of all, by strategic reasoning."
Id. (quoting JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES: STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION OF
RATIONALITY 13 (1983)) (citation omitted).
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reaching a consensus that unfairly or disproportionately excludes the other
parties. 91 In essence, the parties will continue to make bargains and
negotiate an agreement until such time as a majority of the parties share
equally in a benefit. 2 As one observer writes, "members of a losing
coalition always have a large incentive to attempt to become members of
the winning coalition, even at the cost of a less than equal share."93
C. A Summary ofPublic Choice Theory
The interaction of interest groups and policy makers in the political
market is as complex as the intricacies of the economic market. Yet, as in
economics, there are general principles which can be extracted from the
apparent chaos. Drawing particularly upon the observations and analysis
of Olson, Wilson, Hayes, Mueller, and Mitchell, there are "rules" to the
public policy process.94 Special interests and policy makers both begin by
examining the costs and benefits of specific legislative proposals.9' In
analyzing the breakdown of costs and benefits of a specific public policy,
a typology emerges.96
If both costs and benefits are distributed across the population, it is
hard to build consensus among interest groups that are likely to be widely
dispersed and unorganized.97 Anyone seeking to organize the interest
groups runs significant free-rider risks.9 Policy makers have little to gain
or lose and are much more likely to engage in position-taking and use
symbolism. 99
When benefits are concentrated and costs are distributed, interest group
activity is much more likely."° Groups that support the proposed policy
will mobilize to ensure that the benefit is received.'0 Meanwhile,
opposition to the proposed legislation is minimal and faces challenging
free-riderproblems" Forpolicyrmakers, there are "no significant electoral
91 See MUELLER, supra note 13, at 63.92 See id.
93 Id.
94 See supra notes 13-93 and accompanying text.
9' See generally WILSON, supra note 48, at 327-37.
96 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. &PHILIPP. FRICKEY, LEGISLATION 55-56 (2d
ed. 1995); see also infra Appendix 1.
97 See WILSON, supra note 48, at 332-33.
" See HAYES, supra note 30, at 66.
99 See id. at 120-26.
'00 See WILSON, supra note 48, at 333-34.
101 See HAYES, supra note 30, at 66.
'02 See id.
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costs" while there are potentially great electoral benefits and particulari-
zation opportunities. 3 This legislative outcome is, therefore, mutually
beneficial to all parties involved.
A more difficult situation arises when benefits are distributedbut costs
are concentrated."°4 Here, it is predicted that the majority who receives the
benefit will extend it to the maximum limit permitted by the minority upon
which the cost is concentrated."°' Policy makers cannot act without
offending either a ruling interest group or a disenfranchised interest
group." Therefore, policy makers are likelyto delegate the issue to a more
insulated decision-maker.0 7 This situation is often unacceptable to the
minority interest groups who subsequently organize and, through issue
movement models, reverse the dynamics. 08 Those who face a concentrated
cost have fewer free-rider problems and will more willingly accept
transaction costs than the larger interest groups who likely receive only a
small portion of the widely distributed benefit. 19
Finally, when both benefits and costs are concentrated, the legislative
process is guaranteed to be contentious and hard-fought."0 For interest
groups, the outcome is essentially "zero-sum" and likely to result in protest
tactics and open policy conflicts."' The winner gains a benefit at the
expense of the loser's increased burden. Therefore, both sides are likely to
organize effectively and absorb transaction costs. The outcome presents an
acute no-win situation for policy makers, and delegation is even more
likely.
l 2
Public choice theory offers a positive model for predicting legislative
outcomes. In the context of our survey of interest groups and policy
makers, when presented with a specific set of circumstances, the author
believes it is possible to predict with a high degree of accuracy the ultimate
legislative outcome. Applying this theory to the nationaltobacco settlement
affords the opportunity to examine thoroughly the essential elements of
public choice theory.
'03 Id. at 99.
'4See WILSON, supra note 48, at 334-35.
See HAYES, supra note 30, at 66-67.
'06 See id. at 102-08.
107 See id. at 102-05.
108 See id. at 137-38.
" See WILSON, supra note 48, at 335-37.
"0 See id. at 335.
... See HAYES, supra note 30, at 67-68, 108.
112 See id. at 108.
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II. THE 1997 NATIONAL TOBACCO SETTLEMENT:
A CASE STUDY IN PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY
The national tobacco settlement presents a unique circumstance of
legislative activity against which public choice theory may be measured as
a model for predicting legislative behavior. First, this Part will examine the
specific parties involved in the settlement and the motivations for their
involvement or lack thereof.' Second, the analysis will focus on the
negotiations leading up to the final vote on the national tobacco
settlement.114 While policy makers have traditionally been involved in the
formulation of public policy proposals, it will be demonstrated that when
it came to the national tobacco settlement, the policy makers purposefully
avoided involvement until the lastpossible moment." 5 The settlement itself
will also be examined in order to ascertain which interest groups "won" in
formulation of the settlement." 6 At that point, it will also be possible to
classify the national tobacco settlement under the public choice
"cost/benefit" categories identified in Part I.11 Finally, the dramatic
downfall of the settlement is examined both as an illustration of public
choice characteristics (i.e., cycling) and as amodel for legislative decision-
making."
8
A. The Parties and Motivations
In characterizing the parties important to the national tobacco
settlement, one must first examine the role and effectiveness of both pro-
tobacco and anti-tobacco interest groups. The controversy surrounding the
national tobacco settlement encouraged recalcitrant policy makers to
remain largely distanced from the negotiating process." 9
1. The Interest Groups
a. Pro-Tobacco
There are three primary pro-tobacco interest groups relevant to our
discussion. Only one of these, the tobacco industry, was actively organized
" See infra notes 120-211 and accompanying text.
"' See infra notes 212-49 and accompanying text
.. See infra notes 193-211 and accompanying text.
..6 See infra notes 212-49 and accompanying text.
"' See supra notes 94-112 and accompanying text.
US See infra notes 286-92 and accompanying text.
" 9 But see infra note 166 and accompanying text (asserting that Senator Trent
Lott was instrumental in bringing the parties to the bargaining table).
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and effective enough to participate in the tobacco negotiations. The tobacco
industry was mired in incessant rounds of litigation, and an increasingly
large specter of monumental liability loomed on the horizon so that the
proposition of negotiating a permanent settlement and getting on with
business was very appealing. 2 ' The monolithic front of the tobacco
industry made it an effective lobby and, at least to some degree, it
represented the interest of the other pro-tobacco interest groups.' The
alliance between the industry and other pro-tobacco groups, however, was
not exactly built upon mutual trust." Tobacco growers, on the other hand,
were largely unprepared for a shift in the power structure of the tobacco
industry and were unable to effectively participate in the process.lu Users
of tobacco products were even less prepared and were ultimately the
biggest losers in the proposed national settlement. 24
i. The Tobacco Companies
The tobacco industry is well-established in America. Tobacco was a
staple of agricultural life even before the Spanish explorer Benzoni arrived
in 1542.125 The leaf was grown by colonists in Jamestown as early as 1612
and was exportable by 1616.126 Early male colonists would acquire a wife
by "paying her cost of transportation, set at 125 pounds of tobacco."'27 By
'20 See infra notes 125-45 and accompanying text.
121 But see MOLLENKAMP ET AL., supra note 85, at 242-43, 245-46 (showing
that some interests such as growers and smokers were not represented).
" See In a Tobacco State ofMind, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (Lexington,
Ky.), Sept. 11, 1994, at AI0. The newspaper conducted a poll of tobacco growers
concerning their view on the future of the tobacco industry. When asked, "how
often do cigarette companies consider farmer interests when the companies make
decisions?," 94% of respondents said, "never," "rarely," or "sometimes." Only 5%
answered "usually," and only 2% said "always." The article explains that the
percentages do not add up to 100 because of the rounding. See id.
1 See MOLLENKAMP Er AL., supra note 85, at 242-43; Genie Ferris Finger,
Focus on Tobacco Industry, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Aug. 17, 1997, at A10.
.24 See 4 Tobacco FirmsRelease FinancialAnalysis ofProposed National Pact,
[11 Tobacco] Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Mealey Publications, Inc.) No. 12, at 16 (Oct.
23, 1997).
'2 See J. B. KILLEBREW & HERBERT MYRICK, TOBACCO LEAF 3 (1907).
126 See JOHNSON, supra note 63, at 26. Johnson notes with heavy irony that
King James I was opposed to tobacco, believing that it led "to general and new
Corruption both of Men's Bodies and Manners." Id. at 38. Three hundred eighty
years later, President Clinton characterized tobacco as "an addictive drug." Id.
12 7Id. at 26.
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the time the national tobacco settlement was concluded in late June of
1997, it had blossomed into a multi-billion dollar industry. A survey of the
tobacco companies demonstrates the internal power structure of the
industry. In 1997, Phillip Morris USA, whose brands include Marlboro,
Merit, Basic, and Virginia Slims, controlled 47.5% of the United States
cigarette market with net sales of $68.9 billion and 154,000 employees.2 8
R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., a division of RJR Nabisco at the time,
controlled 25.4% of the market with $8.89 billion in sales of Winston,
Camel, Doral, and other brands." 9 Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
a subsidiary of London-based B.A.T. Industries PLC, owned a 16.1%
market share with its GPC, Kool, and Lucky Strike brands and earned a
pre-tax profit of $4 billion in 1997.130 Lorillard Tobacco, a subsidiary of
Loews Corp., and Liggett Group, Inc., a subsidiary of Brooke Group, Ltd.,
accomut for most of the reniining 10% of the market. 3 Finally, United
Stat Tobacco, Inc., had n approximate 80% share of the smokeless
tobipco market and reported revenue of $1.4 billion in 1997.132
The early 1990s were the high-water mark for the tobacco companies.
[F]rom 1994 to 1997, the industry was beset by a string of withering
events: more lawsuits than in the preceding 30 years, leaks of confidential
records, defections by whistle-blowers, an increasingly activist Food and
Drug Administration, the rise of a new breed of consumer-minded and
ambitious state attorneys general, and the reelection of Bill Clinton,
antitobacco president.
33
Indeed, the winds of change were blowing. In August of 1995, the Food
and Drug Administration announced its proposal to regulate tobacco as a
drug.' While there were only eighty-four civil actions pending against
Phillip Morris in 1994, that number had grown to 185 by the end of 1996.111
2 See MOLLENKAMP ET AL., supra note 85, at 7.
129 See id. at 7-8.
130 See id. at 8.
131 See id. at 8-9.
32 See id. at 9.
133 Id. at 18.
134 See id. at 114-15.
131 See 2 Largest Cigarette Makers.Are Reportedly Discussing Possibility of
Settlement, [10 Tobacco] Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Mealey Publications, Inc.) No. 24,
at 3 (Apr. 17, 1997). R.J. Reynolds saw an even more dramatic increase in civil
suits. It reported 54 cases at the end of 1994. Two years later, it was defending 234
cases including actions against its food units. See id.; see also Graham E. Kelder,
Jr. & Richard A. Daynard, The Role ofLitigation in the Effective Control of the
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Judge Okla Jones certified a class action consisting of "all nicotine-
dependent persons . . . who have purchased and smoked cigarettes
manufactured by [tobacco companies]" in Castano v. American Tobacco
Co.'36 In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,37 the industry was first found
liable for smoking-related injuries.' Later, in Carter v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp.,' a Floridajury awarded $750,000 in damages
to a chain smoker diagnosed with lung cancer."4 Mississippi became the
first state to trigger a third wave of litigation by filing a Medicaid
indemnification suit, and other states quickly joined the fight.'
With these setbacks and even more litigation on the horizon, the
tobacco companies were willing to negotiate a settlement with the anti-
tobacco interest groups. The primary objectives for the tobacco companies
were a cap on liability and relief from potential litigation. The combina-
Sale and Use of Tobacco, 8 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 63 (1997). The authors
surveyed the tobacco litigation history and suggested that a "new paradigm" of
litigation opportunities may write the final chapter in the tobacco struggle. This
symposium article was published shortly before Senator Lott's first tobacco
proposal fell apart and before the serious efforts ofnegotiating a national settlement
were begun. See MOLLENKAMP ET AL., supra note 85, at 67, 71-72. The strategies
discussed by the authors were incorporated by various state attorneys general in the
pursuit of the Medicaid indemnification cases. See infra notes 293-357 and
accompanying text.
'36 Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544,560-61 (E.D. La. 1995),
rev'd, 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
17 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 208 (D.N.J. 1988), affd in
part and rev'd inpart, 893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 499 U.S. 935
(1991), and aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 505 U.S. 504 (1992) (reversing the
damages awarded at trial).
138 See id. at 210.
"'39 Carterv. Brown &Williamson Tobacco Corp., [1996] Fla. Jury VerdictRep.
(Fla. Legal Periodicals, Inc.) 9-50 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 8, 1996), available in 1996
WL 566108, writ denied, 680 So. 2d 546 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
140 See id.
"4 See MOLLENKAMP ET AL., supra note 85, at 30. Thirty-eight states joined
Mississippi by filing similar suits. See id.
142 See 2 Largest Cigarette Makers Are Reportedly Discussing Possibility of
Settlement, supra note 135, at 3. Tobacco executives were worried that it was only
a matter of time before juries would award punitive damages. This concern was
echoed by scholars whose concern was focused upon the punitive positions taken
by plaintiff's attorneys seeking to return the favor of decades of defeat. See
generally Alan L. Calnan, Distributive and Corrective Justice Issues in
Contemporary Tobacco Litigation, 27 Sw. U. L. REV. 577 (1998).
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tion of six similarly-situated corporate entities with a common need to fend
off administrative regulation and/or adverse rulings in the judicial system
is a classic circumstance for the formation of an interest group coalition. 43
The only crack in the tobacco companies' edifice was the precarious
financial position of Liggett Group, Inc., and the flamboyant leadership
style of its chief executive officer.1" In the end, however, Liggett was the
big loser in the classic prisoner's dilemma. 145
ii. Tobacco Growers
Tobacco growers enjoy a proud agricultural tradition, 4 6 yet from the
very beginning, they were excluded from the national tobacco settlement.
Their collective interest was not represented at the bargaining table, and
their objectives were never factored into the original settlement.'47
143 See OLSON, supra note 33, at 143. Olson writes, "it follows that these
industries will normally be small enough to organize voluntarily to provide
themselves with an active lobby." Id.; see also HAYES, supra note 30, at 50.
According to Hayes, "highly concentrated industries find it easiest to overcome the
free rider problem and approach government in quest of self-regulatory
legislation." Id. The terms of the negotiated settlement bear this out. See infra Part
II.B.l.
144 See MOLLENKAMP ETAL., supra note 85, at 57-66. Liggett and its chairman,
Bennett LeBow, settled independently with the various states who had filed
Medicaid indemnification suits. See id. at 57. As part of those agreements, Liggett
agreed to release thousands of industry documents. The other tobacco companies
feared the release of these documents and obtained an injunction to prevent their
release. See id. at 121.
141 In the end, the major tobacco companies won out. Even though it did not
have the resources to participate in the national tobacco settlement, Liggett was
included against its will. The other five tobacco companies demanded joinder of
Liggett as a condition to their participation in the settlement. See id. at 224-25.
14 6 See generally VIRGIL S. STEED, KENTUCKY TOBACCO PATCH (1947). Mr.
Steed offers a unique account of a year in the life of the Kentucky tobacco farmer.
'47 See Ron Davis, Colloquy, 22 S. ILL. U. L.J. 485,489 (1998). Dr. Ron Davis,
former Director of the Centers for Disease Control's Office on Smoking and
Health, suggests that the tobacco growers were excluded from the settlement at the
insistence of the tobacco industry. See id. This position underscores a strategic
alliance that developed between the tobacco growers and the health associations.
See Letter from Lynn Carol Birgmann, Director, Kentucky ACTION (Alliance to
Control Tobacco In Our Neighborhoods), to David S. Samford (Oct. 20, 1997) (on
file with author). The industry countered by excluding the growers from the second
version of the settlement that was adopted by the states. The industry promised to
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Pragmatically, the tobacco growers, along with smokers, had the most
straightforward and consistent concerns of any interest group likely to
become involved with the settlement. Growers simply wanted the market
price of tobacco to remain as high as possible and the government to
continue to recognize tobacco as a legitimate agricultural commodity."
While tobacco has always been a cornerstone of the American agricultural
community,149 its impact upon the economy, particularly the economies of
Kentucky, North Carolina, and Virginia, is too easily understated. It is
estimated that over three million non-farm jobs are directly related to
tobacco and that "the industry generates $200 billion a year in revenuo.""0
Thus, the Food and Drug Administration's ("FDA") August 1995
declaration of its intent to regulate tobacco was greeted with #it
skepticism among tobacco growers and the communities that have gtown
around them.1
51
Despite this strong incentive to become involved, there were still
significant organizational problems accompanying the tobacco growers.
The purpose of groups such as the Burley Tobacco Growers Cooperative
Association, the Council for Burley Tobacco, and the Farm Bureau had
been to promote tobacco products, administer the federal tobacco program,
and increase the productivity and efficiency of the individual grower.'
They had never been called to advocate or defend the pure existence of
tobacco until the 1990s.111 While the grower groups had previously
overcome the free-rider problems and transaction costs of organization and
had successfully organized the growers, they were not politically motivated
meet with leaders of tobacco-growing states but offered no further assurances. See
Laura Skillman, Tobacco Farmers Head into Another Year of Uncertainties,
MESSENGER-INQUIRER (Owensboro, Ky.), Dec. 26, 1998, available in 1998 WL
25059450; see also Bill Estep & Janet Patton, Ky. Tobacco Farmers Skeptical,
LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (Lexington, Ky.), Jan. 23, 1999, at C1.
141 See MOLLENKAMP ET AL., supra note 85, at 126.
,49 See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text; see also MOLLENKAMP ET
AL., supra note 85, at 15. The authors cite convincing numbers. Tobacco is "the
country's sixth-biggest crop-fetching $2.5 billion for growers-and the [largest]
non-food crop. Tobacco is remarkably profitable: Farmers earn $4,000 an acre
from tobacco vs. only $400 an acre from strawberries." Id.
150 MOLLENKAMP ET AL., supra note 85, at 15.
' See id. at 242-43.
'
52 See Burley Tobacco Growers Cooperative Association, Articles ofIncorpor-
ation 1-3 (Jan. 11, 1998) (on file with author).
53 See supra notes 133-41 and accompanying text.
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organizations." They were not suited-and were therefore unable-to have
a significant impact on the proposed national settlement until it was sent to
Congress for ratification. Policy makers, particularly those from agricul-
tural states, reacted to the exclusion of the growers and attempted to
include the interests of growers in the final version of the bill. i5 But in so
doing, the issue was further obfuscated when internal divisions within the
growers' community were compounded by the prospect of a federal
tobacco allotment buy-out.
1 56
iii. Tobacco Product Users
The single largest category of pro-tobacco interests groups was also the
most ineffective and inefficient. Despite encompassing a quarter of the
population over the age of eighteen,157 tobacco users have never joined as
an organized entity within the United States.158 If they were to organize, the
most likely unifying interest would be to reduce the harmful effects of
tobacco usage and to keep the cost of tobacco products low. Yet these
smokers and users of smokeless tobacco products are hindered from
organizing effectively for several reasons. These reasons include the
marginal benefits any single individual would receive from participating,
the resulting likelihood of potential participants to "let others do it" (the
classic free-rider problem), and the monumental costs associated with
organizing a national group consisting of millions of individuals.15 9 The
result of these organizational -obstacles is that smokers and users of.
smokeless tobacco products are chronically "under-represented" and forced
" See Burley Tobacco Growers Cooperative Association, supra note 152, at
1-3.
'
5s See infra notes 203,283-85 and accompanying text.
See infra note 285 and accompanying text.
157 See U.S.BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, Current Cigarette Smoking: 1965 to 1993,
in STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1996, at 145 n.222 (116th ed.
1996).
151 Olson points out that an "organization" is a defined subset of the "group."
While a group has many characteristics, it need have only one common interest.
That interest, however, is often the catalyst for the formation of a resulting
organization. See OLSON supra note 33, at 8. Due to the widespread use of tobacco
among individuals of all genders, economic levels, educational levels, and races,
smokers and smokeless tobacco product users are strictly a group under Olson's
theory.
159 See id. at 48.
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to rely upon the tobacco companies to represent their interests. 60 Unfortu-
nately for users, the interests of the tobacco companies and the consumers
they serve are not always parallel.
b. Anti-Tobacco
Staring at the tobacco companies from across the negotiating table was
the cumbersome and loose coalition of the anti-tobacco interest groups. At
various times throughout thenegotiations, individuals representing the state
attorneys general, various health organizations, andtrial attorneys met with
representatives of the tobacco companies.6 ' Their commitment to
eradicating tobacco varied significantly, but they coalesced around the
historic opportunity before them.162 In a North Carolina courtroom, the
FDA waged its own campaign against tobacco. 6 3 Any organizational
problems that the tobacco companies faced were magnified and multiplied
within the anti-tobacco coalition. The simple fact that the coalition
survived long enough to conclude the negotiations is a testament to the will
of its participants.
. The State Attorneys General
The attorneys general of the various states formed the backbone of the
anti-tobacco coalition. The state attorneys general were elected officials
and, like their legislative colleagues, engaged in conduct designed to secure
reelection.' In the beginning of the tobacco controversy, there appeared
to be no concerted effort on the part of the attorneys general to bring the
tobacco industry to the negotiating table-preferring instead to take their
chances in court. 6 ' Instead, the initial meetings between the attorneys
160 See WILSON, supra note 48, at 332-33.
161 See generally MOLLENKAMP ET AL., supra note 85.
162 See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
163 See Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. United States Food & Drug Admin., 966 F. Supp.
1374, 1400 (M.D.N.C. 1997) (holding that the agency exceeded its authority in
regulating the tobacco industry's advertising campaigns but that the FDA may
regulate tobacco as a drug), rev'd, Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Food &
Drug Admin., 153 F.3d 155, 160 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding invalid all of the FDA's
August 28, 1996, regulations of tobacco products).
16' See supra notes 56-67 and accompanying text.
165 See MOLLENKAMP ET AL., supra note 85, at 30. On May 32, 1994,
MississippiAttomey General Mike Moore filed the first Medicaid indemnity action
against the tobacco companies. See id.; see also infra Part I.A. However, it seems
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general and the tobacco companies were arranged by policy makers in
Washington. 1 66 Once the negotiations were underway, however, there was
never a shortage of attorneys general present at the negotiating table. As
more states filed Medicaid indemnity actions, each state's attorney general
became personally involved in the settlement negotiations.
167
As an interest group, the attorneys general faced many of the organiza-
tional challenges previously described.6 Each attorney general was the
highest law enforcement officer of his or her state and could marshal
that Moore was more interested in drafting a proposal that the anti-tobacco
coalition could support and forcing it upon the tobacco companies. See
MOLLENKAMP ET AL., supra note 85, at 102.
166 See MOLLENKAMP ET AL., supra note 85, at 68-70. Senate Majority Leader
Trent Lott (R-Miss.) was the first to establish back-channel communication
between the tobacco companies and Mississippi Attorney General Mike Moore.
Senator Lott's brother-in-law, Dick Scruggs, was acting as an informal advisor to
Moore in the Mississippi Medicaid indemnification action. See id. at 69. With
Scruggs's consent, Lott arranged to have two personal representatives meet with
R.J. Reynolds CEO Steve Goldstone about the possibility of a settlement. See id.
at 70. The result of this meeting encouraged Moore to further pursue the possibility
of reaching an agreement. See id. at 71. Senator Lott hoped that a settlement would
forestall any attacks by President Clinton that Republicans were "soft on Big
Tobacco" as the 1996 presidential elections neared. Id. at 68. Senator Lott's action
may broadly be viewed as an effort to forestall any federal solution to the tobacco
controversy in hopes that individual states would reach their own settlements. This
theory of federal deference was developed as an application of public choice theory
in the federal system. See generally Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to
Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-
Choice Explanation ofFederalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265 (1990).
167 See generally MOLLENKAMP ET AL., supra note 85, at 133. The attorneys
general who favored the negotiated settlement were led by Mike Moore of
Mississippi, Grant Woods of Arizona, Christine Gregoire of Washington, and
Robert Butterworth of Florida. See id. Not all of the attorneys general looked
favorably upon the negotiations or the settlement that was reached. The chief
dissenter was Minnesota Attorney General Hubert H. Humphrey I. See Tobacco
Foes Didn't Get Boon They'd Hoped For in Elections, LEXINGTON HERALD-
LEADER (Lexington, Ky.), Nov. 9, 1998, at A4 [hereinafter Tobacco Foes Didn't
Get Boon]. Humphrey subsequently ran for governor of Minnesota but was
defeated by former pro-wrestler Jesse "The Body" Ventura. This electoral outcome
discredits the notion that the tobacco issue would resonate among voters. Speaking
to Humphrey's defeat, one analyst remarked, "If you get $6 billion for your state
and you come in third, what does that tell you?" Id.
6' See supra notes 33-54 and accompanying text.
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unprecedented legal resources against the tobacco companies. This
advantage was marginally offset by the free-rider problem."6 Attorney
general A would be more than willing to let attorney general B use state B's
resources in preparation for a Medicaid indemnification trial. Any
discovery materials or successful trial strategies could then be used, with
less effort, by attorney general A in his or her own action. As far as the
settlement negotiations went, so long as attorney general A participated at
some minimal level in the negotiations, he or she could claim credit for any
settlement negotiated by attorney general B.70 Since both officials were
from different states with different media markets and were not therefore
competing against one another for publicity, attorney general B would not
publicly discredit A's claim. There were also relatively few transaction
costs for the attorneys general. Many of their internal deliberations were
handled inexpensively by conference calls, and the other costs of the
negotiations were passed on to taxpayers.'
Perhaps the hardest obstacle to overcome, however, was the enigmatic
nature of the interest group itself. In virtually every other public choice
context, the attorneys general would constitute policy makers under
Peacock's "policy execution market."'72 Yet in the tobacco context, they
were an interest group unto themselves. This intergovernmental dynamic
within a federal system of government alone makes public choice analysis
in the tobacco context very unique. This author postulates that this
circumstance is an example of a new trend in public choice analysis. In
public policy markets, the collegial atmosphere of intergovernmental
cooperation will be replaced by fierce "turf battles" and more public
internal conflicts. Governmental bodies will engage in "lobbying" for
public policy just the same as private interest groups do.
ii. The Health Organizations
While the state attorneys general grappled with the legal issues of a
tobacco settlement, several national health organizations focused upon the
scientific and emotional aspects of the deal. Led primarily by Matt Myers
of the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, the health groups were among the
'69 See supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
170See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
'7' See generally MOLLENKAMP ET AL., supra note 85.
172See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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toughest in the anti-tobacco coalition.' The health groups were organized,
articulate, and experienced in the anti-tobacco crusade. 74 They also
remained free from significant free-rider problems or prohibitive transac-
tion costs. Speaking on behalf of groups such as the American Medical
Association, the American Lung Association, the American Cancer
Society, and the American Heart Association, Myers articulated the
guidelines which had to be included in a settlement if the health organiza-
tions were to support it.175 The required provisions included restrictions on
the "manufacture, sale, labeling, distribution and marketing of tobacco
products," a national anti-tobacco advertising campaign, local options to
strengthen anti-tobacco laws, increased FDA authority to regulate warning
labels, complete research disclosure by the industry, and rights to
compensation for victims. 76 More radical groups favored outright
prohibition. These demands were met with mixed results by the negotia-
tors.
17
The health groups felt they had been shut out of the final negotiations
and reaffirmed their opposition to a "soft" settlement. 78 Leading the post-
negotiation charge were former Surgeon General C. Everett Koop and
former FDA Director David Kessler, whose recommendations were even
more rigid than previous demands. They assured that any action by
Congress to pass the settlement as negotiated would be actively opposed by
" See Possible Settlement Talks Ongoing; Health Groups Lay Out Principles
for Deal, [11 Tobacco] Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Mealey Publications, Inc.) No. 2, at
5 (May 15, 1997); see also MOLLENKAMP ET AL., supra note 85, at 187-91. The
Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids is a national initiative sponsored by the National
Center for Tobacco-Free Kids. See National Center for Tobacco-Free Kids,
Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids (visited Apr. 6, 1999) <http://www.tobacco
freekids.org>.
174 See MOLLENKAMP ET AL., supra note 85, at 187-9 1.
175 See Possible Settlement Talks Ongoing, supra note 173, at 5; see also
MOLLENKAMP ET AL., supra note 85, at 187-91. Not all were happy with the
negotiations. Representatives ofMinnesotaAttorney General Hubert H. Humphrey
1H used the public health issue to drive a wedge between the negotiators and the
health organizations. See id.
171 Possible Settlement Talks Ongoing, supra note 173, at 5.
'"See infra notes 250-85 and accompanying text.
"8 See Koop-Kessler Committee Releases Official Report on Tobacco Settle-
ment, [11 Tobacco] Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Mealey Publications, Inc.) No. 6, at 4
(July 17, 1997).
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the health groups. 79 One of the enduring criticisms of public choice theory
is that not all individual actors, interest groups or otherwise, act in their
own rational best interest.18° This theoretical anomaly is common among
coalitions held together solely by a sense of solidarity.'8 ' The health groups
179 See id. Released only a few weeks after the settlement was announced, the
Koop-Kessler Committee recommendations went far beyond what Matt Myers of
the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids had agreed to during the negotiations. See
supra notes 173-76 and accompanying text. The Koop-Kessler recommendations
greatly increased the scope and authority of the FDA by giving it power to regulate
nicotine with the option of phasing it and similar ingredients out over time. Also,
the FDA would be given more money to research nicotine and to share any data
thus gained with the international community. See Koop-Kessler Committee
Releases Official Report on Tobacco Settlement, supra note 178, at 4. The Koop-
Kessler report supported punitive monetary penalties for companies who sold
cigarettes to minors and wide-ranging bans on industry marketing to minors. Under
the Koop-Kessler plan, the tobacco companies would be prohibited from
sponsoring major "athletic, social or cultural events." Id. Proceeds from the
settlement would be used to fund anti-tobacco advertising campaigns and cessation
programs would be mandatory items of coverage in all "health insurance, managed
care and employee benefit plans as well as all federal health financing programs."
Id. Smoking would be banned in all public areas. The Koop-Kessler plan allowed
for local options to further restrict tobacco usage by preserving all rights of action
against the industry. The industry would be forced to disclose all internal
documents relating to tobacco and information relating to their "advertising,
promotion, marketing and political activities." Id. Additionally, information
"shielded by an assertion of attorney-client privilege" would be disclosed. Id.
Finally, the recommendation called for "'significant' excise taxes on tobacco
products." Id.
The recommendation was greeted with both great skepticism and mild
amusement by those sympathetic to the tobacco industry. On its face, the
recommendation was diametrically opposed to the spirit of compromise embodied
in the proposed national tobacco settlement. See infra Part II.B.1. Politically
speaking, the Koop-Kessler Committee gave the savvy industry a "poster-child"
to arouse the emotions of growers and smokers to join in the effort to defeat the
settlement if need be. As the settlement was loaded with amendments and
alterations, pushing the acceptable parameters of the industry, the Koop-Kessler
report was resurrected to help hasten the settlement's demise. See infranotes 250-
85 and accompanying text.
180 See, e.g., Dorothy A. Brown, The Invisibility Factor: The Limits of Public
Choice Theory andPublic Institutions, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 179,222 (1996); Robert
J. Lukens, Comment, Discoursing on Democracy and the Law: A Deconstructive
Analysis, 70 TEMP. L. REv. 587, 652 (1997).
181 See LICHBACH, supra note 35, at 111.
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illustrate the principle that "costs... are benefits."'8 The mere suggestion
of compromise at any level signaled a complete and unconditional
surrender.
8 3
iii. The Trial Attorneys
The issue was even more straightforward for the many trial attorneys
who had spent years being the underdogs in courtroom after courtroom.
After decades of defeat, shifting public sentiment made the tobacco
industry a ripe target for eager trial attorneys. The trial attorneys also had
a more cynical reason for biding their time during the negotiations. The
success of the tobacco settlement might serve as a road map to further
industry-wide litigation opportunities-a nagging fear of some policy
makers. 4 The trial attorneys who were most instrumental in the negotia-
tion of the settlement were the Castano group attorneys. After the Castano
national class action suit was decertified, they resorted to class actions at
the state level. 5 The expense of fifty class actions, however, was
"2 Id. Lichbach writes of such groups. "They relish the spirit of sacrifice and
see themselves as martyrs, national liberators, popular heroes, and guardians of
their group's interest.... For such people, costs become or are benefits." Id.
"I See id. Lichbach characterizes this "process orientation" as a phenomenon
when individuals or groups "take means to be ends." Id. This occurs when they
strongly prefer one particular means over all other means, when they hold
a strong prejudice for a particular course of action.... Such actors reject a
risk-averse, self-absorbed "bourgeois" self-complacency. In its place, they
wish to substitute a fanatical "warrior ethos" that emphasizes the courage
and activism of those who risk their lives in battle.
Id. at 110-11. For example, Steven Goldstone, Chairman of RJR Nabisco,
described his frustration with
the institutional anti-tobacco forces-what Myron Levin of the Los Angeles
Times has called the "growth industry of sophisticated professionals who
are supported by governmental contracts and foundation grants," and who
are devoted to the absolutist advocacy of a single cause-the eradication of
tobacco. I was amazed at the intensity of the emotion, the constant attacks,
the charges and counter-charges, the harsh rhetoric-a general lack of civility
and endless litigation.
Steven F. Goldstone, The Failure of the Tobacco Legislation: Where Is the
PoliticalLeadership? (Oct. 1, 1998), in 64 VrrAL SPEECHEs 760, available in 1998
WL 14128490.
184 See Ed G. Lane, Lane One-on-One, 14 LANE REP. 16 (Aug. 1, 1998),
available in 1998 WL 9782394.
" See Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 737 (5th Cir. 1996)
(decertifying the national class action suit); MOLLENKAMP ET AL., supra note 85,
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prohibitive, especially with a national settlement seemingly within reach.
Working on a contingency fee basis, the Castano group trial attorneys had
the greatest personal stake in the outcome of a national tobacco settle-
ment-a payoff estimated to be approximately $7 million per attorney."6
That interest also made them among the most pragmatic of the negotiators
and suited them well to the role of conciliator. On more than one occasion,
they kept the negotiations from totally breaking down.1
7
iv. The Food and Drug Administration
It is the nature of bureaucratic politics for an agency to compete with
other agencies for government resources,jurisdiction, influence, personnel,
and, most importantly, funding.'88 The dilemma was not unique to the FDA.
The tobacco controversy offered the agency a golden opportunity to
increase its funding, expand its jurisdiction, and "justify" its continued
mission. As early as April 1991, the FDA considered the possibility of
taking on the tobacco industry,8 9 but it was not until the dawn of the
Clinton administration that the political climate was ready for such a
massive regulatory undertaking. 19° The role of the FDA in regulating
tobacco was fiercely contested in the negotiations leading up to the
settlement even though the FDA was never directly involved in the
negotiation process.' 9' Its lack of participation notwithstanding, the FDA
had an enormous amount of credibility and influence throughout the
controversy. 192
2. Policy Makers
a. Congress
The negotiations would be for naught if the policy makers withheld
their endorsement of the deal. Consistent with Hayes's cost/benefit
at 74.
18 6 See MOLLENKAMP ET AL., supra note 85, at 242.
'87 See id. at 197.
188 See HOWARD E. SHUMAN, POLITICS AND THE BUDGET 7 (3d ed. 1992). "The
budget is not only the number-onepolitical document of the country; it also is the
chiefpriorities document. More than any other event or institution, it establishes
national priorities." Id. Agencies competing for budgetary resources are also
competing for preeminence within the public policy process. See id.
"
9 9 See MOLLENKAMP ET AL., supra note 85, at 109.
190 See id. at 115. FDA plans to proceed to regulate nicotine in tobacco were
made public in August 1995. See id.
191 See id. at 209-34.
l9 See id. at 237-38.
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distribution analysis, legislators sought early to preempt a potentially
negative campaign issue. 93 The first attempt at reaching a compromise was
orchestrated from Washington.' After that effort failed, the first tentative
steps to revive a compromise by bringing all parties to the table were again
shepherded by those familiar with Washington's halls of power. 95
Tobacco presented a complex and controversial issue for legislators in
their capacity as public policy suppliers. Assuming that the chief objective
of legislators is to get reelected, the proposed settlement affected congres-
sional behavior in a way that had little to do with the underlying issue. 196
The stated purpose of the settlement was to "see real and swift progress in
preventing underage use of tobacco, addressing the adverse health effects
of tobacco use and changing the corporate culture of the tobacco
industry."'97 These objectives, however, were counterintuitive to many
legislators. While it is very easy to take the position of opposing underage
use of tobacco, the chosen means to that end were not as easy to support.198
Only a small portion of the settlement was actually devoted to access
restrictions. 99 In order to get the access provisions turned into law,
legislators were also asked to support elaborate penalty schemes, deferen-
tial tax options, and increased regulatory authority." As the debate in
Congress continued, legislators grew wary of the fight over funds set aside
to address the health concerns.20' Finally, the so-called corporate culture of
tobacco had been very good to legislators and was a heavy contributor to
both parties.2 2 A settlement that treated the industry unfairly would likely
result in the industry contributing to the legislator's next opponent.
193 See supra note 166 and accompanying text. But see Tobacco Foes Didn't
Get Boon, supra note 167, at A4. The issue may not have been as important as
commentators first thought
'
94 See supra note 166 and accompanying text..
'9' See MOLLENKAMP ET AL., supra note 85, at 71. Clinton confidant Bruce
Lindsey helped arrange the first face-to-face meeting of the tobacco industry CEOs
and the leaders of the anti-tobacco coalition on April 3, 1997. One of the meeting's
facilitators was former Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell, atobacco industry
lobbyist. See id. at 133-37.
'96 See supra notes 56-67 and accompanying text
197 MOLLENKAMP ET AL., supra note 85, at 267.
1 See infra notes 266-92 and accompanying text
9 See infra note 223 and accompanying text.
2 See infra notes 221-34 and accompanying text.
201 See infra notes 232, 254-65 and accompanying text.
2 See Studies Show Record Industry Contributions to Congress, [9 Tobacco]
Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Mealey Publications, Inc.) No. 23, at 31 (Apr. 4, 1996).
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For legislators from tobacco producing states, the proposed settle-
ment's ramifications were even more immediate. Supporting a settlement
that excluded growers would not endear legislators to the agricultural
community. Legislators had virtually no role in the negotiations and thus
were unable to claim credit for simply producing a proposal. 3 Finally, the
issue groups which negotiated the settlement and thus had a vested interest
in the outcome of the national settlement had little in common other than
mutual, deep-seated animosity towards one another. The result was interest
groups (whether the tobacco industry, the trial attorneys, or the health
groups) tinkeringwith the legislation to concentrate their benefits at crucial
points in the legislative process where they had a degree of influence.2"'
What began as a legislative proposal with relatively concentrated benefits
and distributed costs became a legislative nightmare with both benefits and
costs being concentrated.0 5 The final version was at least partially
unacceptable to all anti-tobacco interest groups and completely unaccept-
able to the industry. A vote on the merits forced Congress to put the
interests of one coalition ahead of the interests of another with neither side
being satisfied. Instead, the Senate voted to not vote.2 6 That decision, while
predictable, had little to do with tobacco.
b. The President
In August 1995, President Clinton first tried to turn tobacco into a
campaign issue by directing David Kessler and the FDA to proceed with
the proposed promulgation of tobacco regulations.20 7 Within sixteen
months, President Clinton had moderated andprivately signaled his support
for a tobacco settlement.208 The White House's guidelines for a settlement
203 See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
204See supra note 22; infra notes 254-65 and accompanying text.
205 See infra Part I.B.; see also supra notes 110-12.
2 6 See supra notes 2-8 and accompanying text.
207 See MOLLENKAMP ET AL., supra note 85, at 114-15.
20 See id. at 75. Over Thanksgiving 1996, Castano group attorney Hugh
Rodham laid out a proposal to reach a national tobacco settlement. His brother-in-
law, President Clinton, reacted favorably. See id. On December23,1996, President
Clinton approved the suggestion of North Carolina Governor Jim Hunt to allow a
representative of the tobacco industry to meet with White House Chief of Staff
Erskine Bowles. See id. at 79. Previously a North Carolina businessman, Bowles
was well acquainted with the importance of tobacco to the region. As the
negotiations began the next spring, the White House point of contact for the
negotiators became White House Counsel Bruce Lindsey. Lindsey was a long-time
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were clear: all the parties must take part in the negotiations.219 The Clinton
administration anticipated the lobbying frenzy that would occur when such
an omnibus bill reached Congress, but it was unable to prevent its
destructiveness even from within the executive branch.210 The White House
was unable to go beyond position-taking and failed to set forth a clear
articulation of its long-term tobacco policy objectives. The Clinton
administration, consistent with Ripley's executive-legislative framework, 21'
was unable to muster the votes necessary to forestall the settlement's
defeat. Tobacco failed miserably as a White House initiative. Though
traditionally a policy maker, the White House in this context was really an
interest group in disarray.
B. The Negotiation and Downfall of the National Tobacco Settlement
The pro-tobacco interest groups were unified in their objectives and,
212Thinuwith the exception of Liggett, spoke with one voice. The industry,
growers, and smokers all had prospered or were at least satisfied with the
status quo. Opposing them was a coalition of interest groups with widely
divergent reasons andapproaches for taking on tobacco and challenging the
status quo. While the negotiations with the industry were intense, the
negotiations within the anti-tobacco coalition were fierce.213
personal friend and trusted advisor to the President. His role was to keep the
negotiations going and help resolve any lingering sources of contention. See id. at
84-87.
209 See id.
210 See infra notes 254-56 and accompanying text.
211 See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
212 See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text. As the negotiations were
winding down, the last significant issue was what to do with Jeffrey Wigand, the
Brown & Williamson whistle-blower. Brown & Williamson wished to proceed in
its civil action against him and to enforce his confidentiality agreement. Once the
anti-tobacco coalition rallied around Wigand, the other tobacco companies
preferred to drop the suit and bring an end to the negotiations. Eventually, a
compromise was reached and the settlement was concluded. See MOLLENKAMP ET
AL., supra note 85, at 226-30.
213 After the first round of tentative negotiations, Mississippi Attorney General
Mike Moore was chastised for not involving more of the state attorneys general.
See MOLLENKAMP ET AL., supra note 85, at 72. Later, Moore and Matt Myers of
the National Center for Tobacco-Free Kids were assailed at a meeting of health
groups in Chicago for not being tough enough in the negotiations. See id. at 187-
91. By the time the negotiations reached the critical point, there were too many
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The relative success of the negotiator is analyzed at two levels but is
measured in only one.2 14 The procedural nuances and tactics of a skillful
negotiator are fascinating from a human drama perspective,215 but the end-
game bargain is the substantive measuring rod. Evaluating the substance
of a negotiated agreement requires a two-step inquiry. The first question is
simply, "who gets how much of what?"2 16 Secondly, "who pays how
much?"2 7 Based upon the answer to these two questions, we can assess
who "won" the negotiation process.
people involved in the process to make it efficient or productive. With the
Mississippi Medicaid action looming on the horizon, Moore considered
withdrawing from the negotiating process. See id. at 176-78.214 See MITCHELL, supra note 14, at 125.
215 See id. Mitchell outlines the characteristics of a successful negotiation
process:
1. The bargainers have goals to be achieved.
2. The goals are partially conflicting and partially complementary.
3. The bargainers possess, command, or have access to different
amounts and types of information and other resources.
4. The bargainers are typically somewhat uncertain about the goals and
strategies of others with whom they must deal.
5. Bargainers seldom know all the possible alternative strategies.
6. Each bargainer suspects the other's motives and promises.
7. Bargaining itself is a costly process.
8. Some bargainers are more skilled than others.
9. Situational and institutional constraints have a vital effect on the
success of each bargainer.
10. Some irrational behaviormustbe expected, and the skilled bargainer
learns to predict and identify it.
11. The rules of the game are not always clearly stated or clearly
understood by all bargainers.
12. Bargaining takes time.
13. Much bargaining will be accomplished by implicit exchanges.
14. The terms of the settlement may not be clearly stated nor agreed
upon.
15. Only rarely will an agreement be permanent. Settlements are only
temporary in nature and subject to renegotiation.
16. Bargainers must give up something in order to gain something.
17. No one achieves all he sets out to achieve.
Id. We focus not so much upon the procedural aspect of the negotiations, but rather
upon the substance of the settlement. It is sufficient to say here that both sides were
represented by skillful negotiators. See generally MOLLENKAMP ETAL., supra note
85..
216 MITCHELL, supra note 14, at 9.
217 Id.
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1. The National Tobacco Settlement
The text of the 1997 national tobacco settlement is relatively straight-
forward. Incorporating nine titles, the settlement covers everything from
corporate liability to research funding to tax treatment. Beginning with a
verbose preamble setting forth the historical context and general purpose
of the settlement, the document is a comprehensive legislative proposal.2"'
That comprehensiveness contributed to the settlement's defeat in that it
offered too many reasons to oppose the legislation.219 Before analyzing its
defeat, however, let us examine its provisions and their effect.2 0
Title I of the 1997 national tobacco settlement concerned reforms
to be imposed upon the tobacco industry. The major initiatives resulting
from Title I were significant restrictions on the marketing and
advertising of tobacco products," regulations on warning labels and
218 See MOLLENKAMP ET AL., supra note 85, at 267-70.
219 See infra Part ll.B.2. Implicating public choice analysis, one group of ob-
servers offered an alternative regulatory structure that would promote more
efficient allocations of health care benefits and costs, create safety incentives, and
curb corporate abuse. The plan's greatest attribute was its "political viability." See
Jon D. Hanson et al., Smokers' Compensation: Toward a Blueprint for Federal
Regulation of Cigarette Manufacturers, 22 S. ILL. U. L.J. 519,523 (1998); see also
Richard C. Ausness, Paying for the Health Costs of Smoking: Loss Shifting and
Loss Bearing, 27 Sw. U. L. REV. 537,568-75 (1998). Ausness advocates a federal
administrative compensatory structure to reimburse health care providers-not
tobacco users-for costs associated with treating tobacco-related illnesses. See id.
at 565. This method, it is asserted, would be more efficient than litigation and
would be financed by "an increase in the existing cigarette excise tax." Id. This
approach is attractive because it places the burden of paying for tobacco-related
health care costs upon those whose behavior creates the associated health problems
while maintaining the independence of the user.
0 See generally Attorneys General, Tobacco Companies Enter into Historic
$368.5Billion Pact, [11 Tobacco] Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Mealey Publications, Inc.)
No. 5, at 3 (July 3, 1998).
221 See MOLLENKAMP ET AL., supra note 85, at 271-72. The FDA was
empowered to regulate the marketing and advertising restrictions. The FDA would
have the authority to restrict tobacco advertising to restricted media sources.
Advertising would be restricted to black lettering upon a white background except
in adult-only locations or publications. Tobacco products would be labeled as a
"Nicotine Delivery Device." Brand names and logos would be prohibited from all
non-tobacco merchandise. Tobacco companies would be prohibited from
sponsoring athletic, entertainment, or cultural events if using a brand name or logo.
All human images and cartoon characters were eliminated in the promotion of
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packaging,' 2 access restrictions,' retail licensing,' research and
manufacturing restrictions,2 and corporate compliance.226 Title H created
usage reduction targets with penalty incentives. 7 Title III provided for
enforcement options and categorically mandated Liggett's participation. 8
tobacco products. Tobacco companies were prohibited from advertising outdoors
(including enclosed stadiums) and on the Internet. Also, they could not pay to have
their products used in movies, television programs, or video games. See id.
222 See id. at 272-74. Specific warnings were set forth, as were size and
placement regulations concerning the warning. The size and color of these
warnings were also mandated. See id.
I See id. at 274. The settlement incorporated the FDA rule set forth at 21
C.F.R. § 897.14 (1998), and went beyond it by completely banning vending
machines. See MOLLENKAMP ET AL., supra note 85, at 274.
224 See MOLLENKAMP Er AL., supra note 85, at 275. The licensing provisions
established compliance with the settlement as a prerequisite for receiving and
maiitaining a license. Noncompliance would result in license suspension or
penalties. Licensing fees would be established to cover various administrative
costs. See id.
225 See id. at 275-80. Tobacco would be classified as a "Class II device" in the
application of 21 U.S.C.A. § 360(c) (West Supp. 1998), and the FDA would thus
have the authority to regulate nicotine levels and require product modifications. See
MOLLENKAMP ET AL., supra note 85, at 276. The FDA would regulate "reduced
risk products" and could establish performance standards for the industry to meet
reduced risk levels. Id. A committee to study minimum nicotine dependence levels
would be established. See id. at 278. The tobacco industry would be subject to
manufacturing standards similar to those imposed upon medical device
manufacturers and food companies. See id. at 279. Finally, the industry would be
forced to open its records to the FDA and litigants. See id. at 280.
226 See MOLLENKAMP ET AL., supra note 85, at 282-84. The industry would be
forced to develop internal compliance plans with annual reviews. See id. at 282.
The settlement also protected "whistle-blowers" who reported noncompliances. See
id. at 283. Industry lobbyists must agree to act only upon express authorization by
the industry and to abide by the compliance plans. See id. The Tobacco Institute
and Council for Tobacco Research would be eliminated. See id. Also, penalties for
violations were established. See id. at 284.
227 See id. at 285. Underage tobacco usage would be required to decrease by
30% within five years, 50% within seven years, and 60% within ten years.
Smokeless tobacco would be required to decrease by 25% within five years, 35%
within seven years, and 45% within ten years. If these goals were not met, the
industry would be subject to a fine of up to $2 billion per year. See id.
' See id. at 286-89. The federal government and the states would have
concurrent jurisdiction in the settlement's enforcement See id. at 286. Failure to
release research data to the FDA could result in a $10 million fine per violation.
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Title IV required standards to minimize involuntary exposure to second-
hand smoke, 9 while Title V set forth the scope and effect of federal and
state authority.?10 Title VI established the funding payment scheme for the
$368.5 billion settlement, allowed the industry to pass along its costs to
consumers, and provided that payments would be tax deductible? Title
VII allocated money from the settlement to various health groups and
purposes. 2 Title VIII settled each of the Medicaid indemnity actions and
See id. The industry would enter into consent decrees with the states to allow the
states to enforce the settlement in state court. See id. at 287. "Non-participating
manufacturers would be subject to the access restrictions and regulatory oversight
... [but] would receive none of the civil liability protections." Id. at 288. Since
corporate liability immunity was the industry's chief purpose for entering into the
negotiations, Liggett would be forced to join the settlement or be litigated into
bankruptcy.
1, See id. at 289-90. Smoking in public facilities would be restricted to
approved areas, and employees could not be required to service or clean smoking
areas while occupants were smoking. See id. at 289. Restaurants, with the
exception of fast food restaurants, were exempted. See id. at 289-90.
23o See id. at 290-91. The FDA retained jurisdiction over all products sold or
brought into the United States. See id. at 290. The Bureau ofAlcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms retained its fiscal authority, and the Federal Trade Commission retained
most of its prior authority. See id. The United States Department of Agriculture
would continue to administer the tobacco program. See id. The states would not be
preempted by federal laws from going beyond the minimums established by the
federal government. This provision, in effect, preserved "local options." See id. at
290-91. Butcf PeterD. Enrich & PatriciaA. Davidson, Local and State Regulation
of Tobacco: The Effects of the Proposed National Settlement, 35 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 87, 88 (1998) (asserting that the local-option provisions of the settlement
are ambiguously stated and require extensive redrafting before the final legislation
should be enacted); John Slade & Jack E. Henningfield, Tobacco Product
Regulation: Context and Issues, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 43, 72-74 (Supp. 1998)
(offering an alternative regulatory structure in which the FDA studies the design
of tobacco products, develops more adequate product evaluations, and thereby
establishes safer standards in tobacco product specifications).
231 See MOLLENKAMP ETAL., supra note 85, at 291-93.
232 See id. at 293-95. The allocations were merely suggestions to Congress and
the president. Essentially, money allocated under this provision would either be
used as grants for governmental agencies to implement the settlement, programs
established by the Health and Human Services Secretary, public education
campaigns, tobacco use cessation programs, or medical research relating to
tobacco. See id.
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eliminated the cause of action for some private actions. 3 Title IX
mandated that the settlement would only be binding upon the industry once
ratified by the board of directors of the participating companies."3
The answer to "who gets how much of what" is that everyone got
something it desperately wanted. The FDA's attempt to increase the scope
of its regulatory jurisdiction was overwhelmingly endorsed?215 Its authority
over the tobacco industry was enormously enhanced and resulted in
increased access to governmental resources, new-found credibility in
corporate America, increased agency personnel requirements, and dramatic
funding increases?16 In all respects, this is the justification that every
bureaucratic agency craves. The Castano attorneys were rewarded with key
appointments to settlement fund allocation committees and lucrative
attorney fees. 7
The health groups were also greatly enriched. They were given new
sources for funding their efforts in the settlement and forced the industry
to compromise on several substantive issues such as marketing and
advertising restrictions, local options, and information disclosure.? The
rewards which accrued to the state attorneys general were more intangible.
The real benefits they derived were in the form of settlement money
233 See id. at 296-98. Plaintiffs could not be awarded punitive damages against
the tobacco companies and class actions were eliminated. See id. at 296.
Participating companies would bejointly liable for any judgments suffered against
a company. Nonparticipating companies could not be tried with participating
companies as co-defendants. See id. Only plaintiffs set forth by the settlement
would be able to maintain an action against the industry. See id. at 296-97.
Judgments paid out by the tobacco companies could be credited against their
annual settlement payments. See id. at 297. Civil actions resulting from corporate
conduct after the effective date of the settlement were barred under various
circumstances. See id. at 298.
234 See id.
235 See id. at 290.
236 See id. at 268-69.
" See supra notes 186,232 and accompanying text. Title VII allowed several
of the Castano attorneys to sit upon the committee charged with dispersing $25
billion in medical research grants. See MOLLENKAMP ETAL., supra note 85, at 293.
But see Linda Love, Demonizing Lawyers, OR. ST. B. BULL., Aug./Sept. 1998, at
70 (stating that the United States Chamber of Commerce announced it was
targeting trial lawyers as "greedy men who use victims and false victims to exact
enormous sums from business-driving up the costs of goods and services for all
consumers").
23' See MOLLENKAMP ET AL., supra note 85, at 290-95.
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brought home to each of their states and the favorable publicity that came
along with successfully concluding such a momentous negotiating
process.239
The tobacco industry also came away with several key victories. Its
primary goals of capping corporate liability and reducing potential
litigation opportunities were accomplishedinTitle VIII ofthe settlement.240
A potentially even more beneficial provision was the ability of the industry
to pass along the costs of the settlement to consumers and to then deduct
its settlement payments as ordinary business expenses.241 By some
estimates, the industry actually stood to profit from the $368.5 billion
settlement.242
The payment provisions are a natural segue into the second layer of
substantive analysis, "who pays how much?" 43 Growers and tobacco
product users were totally excluded from the negotiations and were, not
surprisingly, the ultimate losers.2' The entire cost of the $368.5 billion
settlement would be absorbed directly by the smokers and smokeless
tobacco product users. This, of course, would necessitate a dramatic
increase in prices which would fall ironically upon the people who could
least afford such an increase.245 The mandated targets for decreased usage
would have also constricted the market demand for tobacco, thereby
lowering the prices growers would receive for their crop.
24
The negotiations were a resounding victory for all those who partici-
pated, but a crushing defeat for those excluded. The benefits conferred
239 See supra notes 56-67 and accompanying text.
240 See supra notes 142, 233 and accompanying text.
241 See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
242SeeFTCReport Critical ofProposed Tobacco Deal, [11 Tobacco] Mealey's
Litig. Rep. (Mealey Publications, Inc.) No. 10, at 8 (Sept 25, 1997). But see 4
Tobacco Firms Release FinancialAnalysis ofProposed National Pact, supra note
124, at 16.
243See supra note 217 and accompanying text
244See 4 Tobacco Firms Release Financial Analysis ofProposed National Pact,
supra note 124, at 16; Finger, supra note 123, at A10.
245 See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, Personal Health Practices, by Selected
Characteristics: 1990, in STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1996,
supra note 157, at 146 n.224. The U.S. National Center for Health Statistics study
suggests an inverse relationship between income and tobacco usage. As income
increases, the proportion ofpeoplewho currently smoke decreases. The study states
that 31.6% of people earning less than $10,000 are currently smokers. Whereas
only 19.3% of those earning $50,000 or more currently smoke. See id.
246 See 4 Tobacco Firms Release FinancialAnalysis ofProposed National Pact,
supra note 124, at 16.
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were concentrated in the participants, and the costs associated with the
settlement were widely dispersed. The settlement would have passed as
written, but as the settlement languished in Congress, other groups who felt
excluded attempted to gain a portion of the proceeds.247 Even groups that
stood to benefit from the enactment of the original settlement attempted to
increase the size and scope of their benefits relative to the other partici-
pants.248 This jockeying for position, combined with legislative tinkering,
radically transformed the national tobacco settlement and ensured its
defeat.249
2. The Downfall of the National Tobacco Settlement
Even as the ink was drying upon the signatures of the national tobacco
settlement, objections were being raised in Congress, on editorial pages,
and across the airwaves. Special interest groups that were left out of the
settlement objected, as did special interest groups that were included in the
negotiations." Policy makers objected that the settlement went too far and
trampled upon the Constitution while others objected that the settlement
had not gone far enough."1 Taken at face value, the original legislative
proposal would have stood a good chance at passing, but the subsequent
amendments and pointed debate assured defeat. The package that concen-
trated benefits and distributed costs metamorphisized into a proposal that
concentrated both benefits and costs creating a zero-sum situation. 2 Early
supporters of the settlement retreated, and those who opposed passage
gained momentum.23 The events of June 17, 1998, came as no surprise as
public choice theory was affirmed as a legislative outcome prediction tool.
247 See infra notes 250-85 and accompanying text.
248 See infra notes 254-65 and accompanying text
249 Professor Wilson observed, "Though associations will form if there is a
chance of influencing the key official with respect to the policies he controls, more
associations will form and will be more vigorous if there are many officials
involved in decision-making, each with his legally or constitutionally protected
sphere of authority." WILSON, supra note 48, at 80. This dynamic is clearly at work
in the period of deliberation leading up to the settlement's legislative defeat.
" See infra Part II.B.2.a.
25 See infra Part II.B.2.b.
2 See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
An industry spokesman said this of the settlement's defeat: "We just view
it as a reflection that the public clearly understands that the debate had strayed far
from the purpose of the June 20 agreement, which was to curb teen smoking."
Senate Stops Work on McCain Tobacco Bill, [12 Tobacco] Mealey's Litig. Rep.
(Mealey Publications, Inc.) No. 4, at 4 (June 18, 1998).
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a. Special Interest Objections
The settlement vividly illustrated the law of unintended consequences:
"What is so intriguing is how the goals of one program can be subtly and
persistently subverted by the goals of another program and by another set
ofpeople." 4 The administrator of the Health Care Financing Administra-
tion ("HCFA"), which administers the federal Medicaid program, testified
before Congress that the agency would be entitled to reimbursement under
section 1903(d) of the Social Security Act."~ The Health Care Financing
Administration's subrogation effort was fiercely opposed by state officials.
Forty-seven attorneys general signed a petition opposing any subrogation,
and the National Governors Association registered its disapproval .2 6
Economic analysis of the settlement suggested that the $368.5 billion
price tag was too low. TheBerkely Economic Research Associates reported
that the figure "must be understood as the absolute minimum, the floor, for
the total economic burden imposed by tobacco." 7 A Federal Trade
Commission study concluded that the industry actually stoodto profit from
the settlement. 8 The industry, in its own studies, disputedthese findings. 2 9
As time went on, more interest groups asserted claims. The asbestos
litigants believed they were entitled to a share of the settlement's proceeds.
2-4 MITCHELL, supra note 14, at 261.
"-s See Federal Subcommittee Warned Not Tamper With States 'Settlement, [ 11
Tobacco] Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Mealey Publications, Inc.) No. 16, at 3 (Dec. 18,
1997); see also Cliff Sherrill, Comment, Tobacco Litigation: Medicaid Third Party
Liability and Claims for Restitution, 19 U. ARK. LrTTLE ROCK L.J. 497, 497-518
(1997) (asserting that the basis of the subrogation claim was restitutionary and
examining the federal government's claims in light of various state substantive
laws).
256 See Attorneys General Tell President They WantAll of Tobacco Settlement,
[11 Tobacco] Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Mealey Publications, Inc.) No. 14, at 19 (Nov.
20, 1997). But see Koop, Kessler Support Federal Claims to Tobacco Money,
CONGRESS DAILY (Oct. 13, 1998), available in 1998 WL 13131418. The Koop-
Kessler committee defended HCFA's indemnification claim. See id.
257 New Survey Says Costs of Cigarette Smoking Quadruple Settlem ent Figure,
[11 Tobacco] Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Mealey Publications, Inc.) No. 11, at 17 (Oct.
9, 1997).
2" See FTC Report Critical of Proposed Tobacco Deal, supra note 242, at 8.
The report cited caps on liability and savings in litigation and advertising expenses
combined with higher prices as the primary justification for the finding. See id.
29 See 4 Tobacco Firms Release FinancialAnalysis ofProposedNational Pact,
supra note 124, at 16.
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Representatives from that interest group asserted that they were entitled to
between $15 billion and $80 billion.26° The basis for this claim was the
smoking-related illnesses suffered by asbestos workers.26 As one
spokesman told Congress, "[O]ur soon to-be largest mass tort-tobacco--is
about to be infused into virtually every case that makes up our current
largest mass tort-asbestos. 262
Groups that were represented in the negotiation also criticized the
settlement. The Koop-Kessler committee, joined by Dr. George D.
Lundberg, editor of the Journal ofthe American MedicalAssociation, was
an outspoken critic of the settlement and alleged that the anti-tobacco
negotiators had given away too much.263 The American Lung Association
labeled the settlement "'premature and wrong."' 2 In hearings before the
Senate Judiciary Committee, at least two attorneys general voiced concern
over the immunity provisions.265
260 See Asbestos Alliance Feels Left Out of Settlement, Promises Tobacco
Lawsuits, [11 Tobacco] Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Mealey Publications, Inc.) No. 21,
at 6 (Mar. 5, 1998).
261 SeefHouseJudiciary CommitteeHears ProposalforAsbestos Tobacco Trust,
[11 Tobacco] Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Mealey Publications, Inc.) No. 19, at 13 (Feb.
5, 1998).
262 Id. A proposal submitted to Congress called for a Tobacco Asbestos Trust.
The trust would first provide benefits to asbestos workers with tobacco-related
illnesses who had already settled or had pending claims. The other fund would pay
for future claims. The asbestos group attorneys opposed tobacco industry
immunity. See id. But cf Richard C. Ausness, Cigarette Company Liability:
Preemption, Public Policy, andAlternative Compensation Systems, 39 SYRACUSE
L.REv. 897,970-71 (1988). Nine years before the settlementwas signed, Professor
Ausness keenly observed that in light of the asbestos cases, litigation may not be
the most effective method of regulating the tobacco industry. "The tort system
seems to have failed to resolve asbestos claims efficiently and it may fail again if
cigarette companies are subjected to comparable liability. If this should occur,
some sort of legislative solution will be necessary." Id.
263 See supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text; see also Koop, Kessler,
Lundberg Tell Congress: 'No Deals', [11 Tobacco] Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Mealey
Publications, Inc.) No. 20, at 12 (Feb. 19, 1998).
264 Attorneys General, Tobacco Companies Enter into Historic $368.5 Billion
Pact, supra note 220, at 3. Some health activists, however, feared that by placing
heavier restrictions upon access to tobacco products, they were encouraging
teenagers to try the "'forbidden fruit."' John Carey, Smoke and Mirrors from Big
Tobacco?, BUS. WK., Sept. 21, 1998, at 6.
265 See Senate Judiciary Committee Addressing Details of Historic Tobacco
Resolution, [11 Tobacco] Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Mealey Publications, Inc.) No. 7,
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b. Policy Maker Objections
By the time the settlement was passed by the Senate Commerce
Committee, its cost had grown to $506 billion.2" As the settlement began
to far exceed the scope of the agreement reached .by negotiators a year
earlier, the tobacco industry began to fear its effects and began to work for
its defeat.267 Political watchdog groups began to claim that the industry was
attempting to buy a legislative outcome.268 Several Senators feared that the
grant of power to the FDA to regulate advertising would be a violation of
the First Amendment.269 One senator stated that smoking was not the most
important problem facing teenagers and should be addressed only after
such issues as teenage drug abuse and illegitimate pregnancies had been
addressed.270
at8 (Aug. 11, 1997).
266 See Commerce Committee Passes $506 Billion Tobacco Bill Opposed by
Industry, [11 Tobacco] Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Mealey Publications, Inc.) No. 23,
at 3 (Apr. 2, 1998). The bill passed the committee on April 1, 1998, by a vote of
19-1. See id.
267 See Senate Stops Work on McCain Tobacco Bill, supra note 253, at 4. The
tobacco industry spent an estimated $40 million on an advertising campaign
opposing the settlement's final version. See id.
268 See Studies Show Record Industry Contributions to Congress, [9 Tobacco]
Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Mealey Publications, Inc.) No. 23, at 31 (Apr. 4, 1996).
Common Cause, a national organization dedicated to the watchdog role, released
a report showing that over aten-yearperiod, the tobacco industry had given "nearly
$20.6 million in PAC and soft money contributions, including nearly $10 million
in PAC contributions to Congressional candidates and nearly $9 million in soft
money contributions to the political parties." Id. The contributions favored
legislative leaders and those who sat on the Senate and House Commerce
Committees, the committees responsible formostlegislation affecting tobacco. See
id.
269 See Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. United States Food & Drug Admin., 966 F. Supp.
1374, 1400 (M.D.N.C. 1997) (holding that the agency exceeded its authority in
regulating the tobacco industry's advertising campaigns but that the FDA may
regulate tobacco as a drug), rev'd, Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Food &
Drug Admin., 153 F.3d 155, 160 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that "all of the FDA's
August 28, 1996 regulations of tobacco products are thus invalid"); see also Daniel
B. Kamensky, Note, Will Congressional Action Go Up in Smoke? Overcoming
Obstacles in Granting the FDA Jurisdiction Over Tobacco Products, 86 GEO. L.J.
2677, 2677 (1998) (asserting that the Fourth Circuit's ruling opened the door to
further congressional authorization of regulatory power to the FDA).
270 See Lane, supra note 184. Senator Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) told a local
magazine, "Teenagers have a lot of problems these days and by any objective
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Another major issue to legislators was the attorney fee provisions.
Senator Slade Gorton (R-Wash.) sponsored an amendment which capped
fees attorneys could charge based upon when a tobacco-related suit was
filed.271 Attorneys who filed suit early in the controversy would be able to
charge a higher fee.2' This formula was passed over the objection of
groups such as the Tobacco Products Liability Project.2" Senators were
also sensitive to public concerns that the tobacco companies might profit
from the settlement.274 Studies estimating the effect ofthe settlement onjob
creation were vastly different but exceedingly negative.2 7 5 For once, the
smokers themselves made their collective voices heard,276 andthe industry
was quick to point out that as the settlement grew in scope, so too would
the price of cigarettes-by as much as $1.50 per pack.2 It was labeled a
standard smoking is not the most important one. The Clinton administration has
had little or no interest in the drug issue." Id.
271 See Senate Stops Work on McCain Tobacco Bill, supra note 253, at 4.
272See id.
273 See id.
274 See Senate Judiciary Committee Addressing Details of Historic Tobacco
Resolution, supra note 265, at 8.
275 See Less Tobacco Sales Will Not Cost Jobs, One Study Says; Others Say
Over92,0OOJobs atRisk, [10 Tobacco] Mealey'sLitig. Rep. (MealeyPublications,
Inc.) No. 1, at26 (May 2, 1996). One survey estimated that there would be 220,000
jobs lost in the southeastern United States, but that nationwide, the settlement
would create 355,000 additional jobs. A different study estimated that there would
be a net loss of 31,807 to 92,501 jobs. A third study estimated that the settlement
would eliminate between 21,333 and 44,167 jobs. See id.
276 See Major Garrett & Kenneth T. Walsh, Congress Snuffs Out the Tobacco
Bill: Ad Blitz Turned Debate from Health to Taxes, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
June 29, 1998, at 30. Senator Christopher Bond's office (R-Mo.) received 400
phone calls supporting the tobacco bill and 50,000 opposing it. See id. During the
debate, there was an average of 8000 to 10,000 callers a day to Senate offices. See
id. at 32. An industry spokesman said, "'We turned from our historic reliance on
the inside game to the electronic media."' Id.
277 See Tobacco Industry Disagrees with Clinton Proposal for National
Settlement, [11 Tobacco] Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Mealey Publications, Inc.) No. 10,
at 6 (Sept. 25, 1997). President Clinton suggested this price increase as a means of
reducing youth usage of tobacco products. See id.; see also U.S. Dept. of Health &
Human S erv.,Response to Increases in CigarettePrices byRace/Ethnicity, Income,
andAge Groups-United States, 1976-1993,47 MORBIDITY &MORTALITYWKLY.
605A (1998), available in 1998 WL 10376673. This report seemed to validate the
assumption that higher prices would "decrease the prevalence of smoking and the
number of cigarettes smoked both by youth and adults." Id. (citation omitted). The
editor notes, "The findings in this report indicate that lower-income and minority
[VOL. 87
PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY
"poor tax"278 by some, and attempts were made to load the settlement with
provisions which may or may not be germane to the tobacco issue.279
With concern growing ever the elimination of various rights of action,
alternative proposals were offered. Senate Democrats supported a bill
sponsored by Senator Kent Conrad (D-N.D.) which would force attorneys
to arbitrate their fees, preserve private rights of action, and allocate
settlement proceeds to "children's health care, Medicare and Social
Security, as well as to research and cessation programs."2 80 A Republican
version, sponsoredby Senator James Jeffords (R-Vt.), preservedthe FDA's
enhanced authority, reaffirmed advertising restrictions, and set forth
penalties if adolescent usage did not decrease. 28' There was no mention of
prohibitions on individual actions.282
Coming late to the game, the White House announced that it could not
support a settlement that excluded the interests of tobacco growers.283
Growers were incorporated into national tobacco legislation by Senator
Wendell Ford's (D-Ky.) LEAF Act, which provided $28.5 billion for
continuation ofthe current tobacco program, a voluntary buyout of existing
tobacco allotments, and educational and economic development investment
in tobacco communities. 24 The buyout, however, ultimately caused further
divisions within the grower community.
285
smokers would be more likely than other smokers to be encouraged to quit in
response to a price increase and thus would obtain health benefits attributable to
quitting.... Tobacco-use prevention and cessation programs should be made
available to benefit those populations paying the greatest share of the increased
prices." Id.
278See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
279 See Spending, Tax Proposals Control Senate Debate on McCain Tobacco
Bill, [12 Tobacco] Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Mealey Publications, Inc.) No. 3, at 3
(June 4, 1998). SenatorMcCain (R-Ariz.), the bill's sponsor, proposed a $3 billion
allocation of settlement proceeds to veterans who suffer from smoking-related
illnesses. SenatorPhil Gramm (R-Tex.) supported an amendment that would reduce
the marriage penalty in the federal internal revenue code. See id.
" Republicans, Democrats Push New Proposals in the Senate, [11 Tobacco]
Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Mealey Publications, Inc.) No. 20, at 10 (Feb. 19, 1998).
81 See id.
282 See id.
23 See Tobacco Industry Disagrees with Clinton Proposalfor National Settle-
ment, supra note 277, at 6.
284 See Al Cross, Ford Offers Tobacco Bill, Plan Would Keep Price Supports,
Give Farmers Help, COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Oct 24, 1997, at Al.
285 See id. The buyout was heavily favored among older farmers who were
ready to retire. Younger growers, on the other hand, worried about the long-term
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C. The Predictable Death of the National Tobacco Settlement
The bill that died on the Senate floor was hardly recognizable as the
settlement that was reached a year earlier. Instead of everyone who
participated gaining at the expense of a diffuse and unorganized array of
individuals, passage of the final version would be marginally beneficial to
anti-tobacco interests and very detrimental to pro-tobacco interests.286 Too
many amendments had been offered and too much vindictive rhetoric had
poisoned the well of good will." 7 The national tobacco settlement had
ceased to be about reducing youth usage of tobacco products and had
become an exhibition in economic redistribution. Instead of a legitimate
exercise of needed regulatory authority, it degenerated into a scramble for
a more intrusive bureaucracy. Instead of focusing narrowly upon reducing
tobacco product usage and Medicare indemnification, the settlement had
become a rambling legislative blunder with too many objectives, too many
formulas, too many regulations, and too many opponents.218 The sheer size,
scope, and effect of the national tobacco settlement caused it to fall under
its own weight.
It should come as no surprise then to understand why legislators voted
as they did. As Professor Hayes wrote, "Of course Congress may also
respond by passing no bill at all, although in doing so it may be making an
explicit choice among contending groups by denying demands for
change."289 The proverbial path of least resistance was to leave the status
quo alone. The preferred mechanism to do so was an old Senate rule of
procedure.29 In so doing, Congress allowed the states to continue in their
individual efforts against the industry and left open the door for a future
national settlement. It was no small coincidence that Congress also avoided
the wrath of many organized constituent groups by not voting either for or
against the substantive provisions of the final version.29' The interest
groups and policy makers played their roles valiantly and performed as
would be postulated under public choice theory.
292
effects that a one-time buyout might trigger. See id.286 See supra notes 250-85 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 266-85 and accompanying text.2.See supra notes 250-85 and accompanying text.
'9 HAYES, supra note 30, at 29.290 See supra notes 2-8 and accompanying text.
291 See supra notes 56-67 and accompanying text
292See supra notes 120-211 and accompanying text.
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III. THE SECRET TO SUCCESSFUL SETTLEMENTS AT THE STATE LEVEL
While the attempt to secure passage of a national tobacco settlement
was ultimately futile at the federal level, similar efforts met with far
different results in individual states. Generally speaking, the conditions for
settling the Medicaid indemnity actions were more favorable in individual
states. While the public choice principles examined above still applied, 93
there were often fewer interest groups with which to contend. With the
continuing exception of Liggett, the tobacco industry spoke with one
voice.219 In non-tobacco producing states, there was no need for growers to
enter into the settlement process. Where the state economy was signifi-
cantly impacted by tobacco as an agricultural crop, the state political
leaders did not even file Medicaid indemnity actions.295 As in the national
settlement context, there were still too many organizational hazards for
smokers to play a factor.
Within the typical state anti-tobacco coalition, the industry faced only
one attorney general whose influence over the ratification of a settlement
and its subsequent enforcement was greatly enhanced relative to his
fractional interest in a national settlement.2 96 The single greatest difference
between the federal and state negotiations was that the attorney general
ceased to be an interest group and became an executive policy maker. The
health organizations did not have the resources of their parent national
organizations, and this affected the process in two significant, interrelated
ways. First, an attorney general in his or her policy making capacity was
more inclined to garner health group support by taking positions sympa-
thetic to the public health cause. Without the numerical and financial
resources of the national health organizations, the attorney general could
also compromise on key points without immediate fear of reprisals from
state affiliates. Second, the health organizations were unable to voice any
credible dissenting opinions concerning a state settlement and were often
forced to simply accept it.297 The same problems affectedthe trial attorneys.
293 See supra notes 13-112 and accompanying text
294 See supra note 144-45 and accompanying text
295 The attorneys general of Kentucky, North Carolina, and Virginia all elected
not to file Medicaid indemnity actions and took no substantive role in brokering the
national settlement.296 See supra PartlI.A. 1.b.i.
297 See, e.g., Peter Mantius, $4.8 Billion for Georgia Tobacco Settles with
States, Halts Youth Appeal Ads, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Nov. 21, 1998, at Al,
available in 1998 WL 3727601; Susan Kinzie, 46 States Sign on to Tobacco
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The difficulty and costs associated with litigating a major tobacco liability
case were enormous and dissuaded many firms from seeking them out."'
Finally, the FDA and other federal agencies had little directly at stake in
state settlements.29
It is therefore predictable that the states would fare better in settling
their claims against the tobacco industry. The focus of this Note will now
shift to a sampling of the states that did file Medicaid indemnity actions.3°
Some states were successful while others were not. The reasons for both
results are consistent throughout our survey.
A. Mississippi
Mississippi Attorney General Mike Moore filed his state's Medicaid
indemnity action, the first in the nation, against the tobacco industry on
May 23, 1994.301 From the beginning, his efforts were challenged.
Mississippi Governor Kirk Fordice's petition to dismiss the suit, alleging
that Moore had usurped his constitutional duties, was denied by the
Mississippi Supreme Court.0 2 Moore continued in the preparation of his
case, listing sixty potential expert witnesses with knowledge in everything
from corporate finance to toxicology and accounting to pediatrics.
33
Settlement Maine Hops on Train, May Get $1.4 Billion, BANGOR DAILY NEWS,
Nov. 21, 1998, available in 1998 WL 22866821.
298 See PETER PRINGLE, CORNERED: BIG TOBACCO AT THE BAR OF JUSTICE 17-
21 (1998). Pringle relates the events surrounding a Mississippi case where the
American Tobacco Co. spent approximately $10 million in the defense ofaproduct
liability action. The small town plaintiffs attorney, by contrast, spent
approximately $260,000. After a mistrial, a second jury determined that American
Tobacco Co. was equally liable for the plaintiff's injuries but awarded no damages.
See id.
299 But see Federal Subcommittee Warned Not To Tamper With States'
Settlement, supra note 255, at 3. The Health Care Financing Administration
("HCFA") sought to seek indemnification from the state settlement proceeds. See
id.
31 See infra notes 301-57 and accompanying text. For a graphical compilation
of the state settlements, see infra Appendix 2.
301 See MOLLENKAMP ET AL., supra note 85, at 30.
3 See In re Fordice, 691 So. 2d 429,435 (Miss. 1997) (holding that the court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to issue the sought after writ).303 See Potential Defense Experts Identified in Mississippi Medicaid Recovery
Suit, [10 Tobacco] Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Mealey Publications, Inc.) No. 21, at 14
(Mar. 6, 1997).
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Having finalized the national settlement a month earlier, the industry
decided that it did not want to take its chances in a Mississippi courtroom.
The deal it reached with Moore was similar in structure to the national
settlement but was limited to only the Medicaid indemnification
provisions.3 It provided for a payment schedule of "a 1.7% share of the
part of the annual ongoing payments which are contemplated to be paid to
the states. 30 5 In the event the national settlement did not pass, Mississippi
would still receive up to $10 billion from the industry. In addition, the
tobacco companies also paid $170 million to the State of Mississippi on
July 15, 1997.1°6 The settlement also provided for industry funding of a
pilot program to reduce underage use of tobacco.3 7 The settlement
submitted attorney fees to arbitration, provided for joint and several
liability for the tobacco companies, gave the industry a credit on prior
payments in the event a national settlement passed, and placed some
voluntary restrictions on advertising and marketing.30 8 The Mississippi
settlement became the model for subsequent state settlements.
B. Florida
Florida took a different approach. In 1994, the Florida legislature
passed the Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act which allowed the state to
seek reimbursement for expenses it would incur while financing its share
of the Medicaid program °.3 This legislative goal, however, may have been
304 See Just Days Before Tial, Mike Moore, Tobacco Firms Reach $3 Billion
Deal, [11 Tobacco] Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Mealey Publications, Inc.) No. 6, at 3
(July 17, 1997).
305 Id.
306 See id.
30 See State MedicaidAction, [11 Tobacco] Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Mealey Pub-
lications, Inc.) No. 17, at 18 (Jan. 8, 1998).
31 See 'FavoredNation Clause' Gets State ofMississippiAnother$55OMillion,
[12 Tobacco] Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Mealey Publications, Inc.) No. 6, at 7 (July 16,
1998).
309 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.910 (West 1998); see also Sherrill, supra note
255, at 502-04 (noting the restitutionary nature of the Florida act). But see Tiffany
S. Griggs, Medicaid Reimbursement from Tobacco Manufacturers: Is the States'
Legal Position Equitable?, 69 U. CoLO. L. REv. 799, 813-22 (1998) (highlighting
the abrogation of affirmative defenses available to the industry and the states' own
lack of innocence due to their collection of excise taxes on tobacco products and
subsequent revenue dependence thereon); Robert A. Levy, Tobacco Medicaid
Litigation: Snuffing Out the. Rule of Law, 22 S. Ill. U. L.L 601, 601 (1998)
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counterproductive in that at least one study found the law to be revenue
adverse."' The law was quickly challenged in the courts, but to no avail. In
Agencyforffealth CareAdministration v. AssociatedIndustries ofFlorida,
Inc.," the law was unsuccessfully alleged to be unconstitutional. The
legislature voted to repeal the law in early 1996, but the repealing act was
vetoedby Governor Lawton Chiles.3 13 In American Tobacco Co. v. State,
314
Florida formally sought Medicaid indemnification. 315 The industry
retaliated by filing a counterclaim for contribution against the state,
alleging that Florida had given away high tar cigarettes to pisoners within
its custody.1 6 In a series of orders, the presiding judge granted the
industry's summary judgment motion on Florida's claim for future
damages, struck down a Department of Corrections affirmative defense,
and otherwise narrowed the focus of the upcoming trial.317 In depositions,
(criticizing the Florida statute as a scorched earth campaign against the tobacco
industry at the expense of the rule of law); Christa Sarafa, Making Tobacco
Companies Pay: The Florida Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act, 2 DEPAUL J.
HEALTH CARE L. 123 (1997) (asserting that the majority opinion in Agency for
Health CareAdmin. v. Associated Indus. ofFla., Inc., 678 So. 2d 1239 (Fla. 1996),
was unfair to the tobacco industries and deprived them of an adequate defense).
310 See Christopher May, Note, Smoke andMirrors: Florida's Tobacco-Related
Medicaid Costs May Turn Out to be a Mirage, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1061, 1081-83
(1997). This study suggests that over the thirteen-year period prior to enactment of
the Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act, Florida collected approximately $4.5
billion in excise taxes on tobacco products. During this same period, the combined
cost of tobacco-related health care costs amounted to $1.372 billion. Because of the
cost of pursuing litigation and the fact that damages may be nonexistent in light of
these numbers, the statute may actually cost the state money, thus undermining its
primary basis for passage. See id.
"' Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Associated Indus. of Fla., Inc., 678 So.
2d 1239 (Fla. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1115 (1997).
312 See id. at 1256-57.
313 See Florida Senate Fails to Override Chiles' Veto; Tobacco Suit Can
Continue, [9 Tobacco] Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Mealey Publications, Inc.) No.22, at
15 (Mar. 21, 1996).
314 American Tobacco Co. v. State, 697 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
315 See id. at 1251.
316 See Tobacco Companies Seek to File Counterclaim Against State in Florida
Action, [10 Tobacco] Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Mealey Publications, Inc.) No. 21, at
7 (Mar. 6, 1997).
317 See Fla. Judge Issues Pretrial Orders on Future Damages, Judgment,
Market Share, [11 Tobacco] Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Mealey Publications, Inc.) No.
6, at 21 (July 17, 1997).
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Philip Morris Chairman and CEO Geoffery Bible admitted that "cigarettes
'might have' killed 100,000 Americans. '3 8 His counterpart at RJR
Nabisco, Steven F. Goldstone, stated that "'cigarette smoking plays a role
in causing lung cancer.' 319 As the trial entered the jury selection stage, the
industry decided to settle.320 The terms of the Florida settlement were
similar to the earlier accord in Mississippi.32 1 The face value of the
settlement was $11.3 billion and would be used to pay for Medicaid
expenditure recovery, youth usage reduction programs, and attorneys
fees.32 In addition, the industry agreed to support new laws designed to
restrict and punish youth access to tobacco and to ban large outdoor
advertising.323 The settlement did not discourage the industry from further
lobbying.324 As the 1998 election cycle drew to a conclusion, the industry
reportedly contributed $350,000 to the majorpolitical parties inFlorida and
their candidates.3z
C. Texas
Texas filed its Medicaid indemnity action, Texas v. American Tobacco
Co.,326 on March 28, 1996, in federal court.32 7 The complaint consisted of
ten counts and covered the whole spectrum of potential liability, including
"counts under the Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO), Sherman Act, Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act,
negligence, [products liability], breach of express and/or implied warran-
ties, restitution, unjust enrichment, common law public nuisance, negligent
318 Florida Settles with Tobacco Companies for $11.3B, [Tobacco Indus.]
Andrews Litig. Rep. (Andrews Publications) 16,647 (Sept. 12, 1997).
319 Id. at 16,648.
310 See State of Florida, Tobacco Industry in Agreement on $11.3 Billion
Settlement, [11 Tobacco] Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Mealey Publications, Inc.) No. 9,
at 3 (Sept. 4, 1997).
321 See supra notes 304-08 and accompanying text.
3
1 See Florida Settles with Tobacco Companiesfor $11.3B, supra note 318, at
16,647.
"3 See id.
324 See id.
31 See Tobacco Industry StillBigPolitical Player, FLA. TODAY, Oct. 17, 1998,
at 7B, available in 1998 WL 18647320.3' Texas v. American Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 956 (E.D. Tex. 1997).
327 See Texas Files Medicaid Suit in Federal Court, Marking Seventh Such
Case, [9 Tobacco] Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Mealey Publications, Inc.) No. 23, at 3
(Apr. 4, 1996).
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performance of a voluntary undertaking and fraud and intentional
misrepresentation."328 Several of these counts were limited, however, by a
Texas state court ruling in Perez v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.329
The Texas settlement followed the pattern of the Mississippi and Florida
settlements. Its final estimated value was $17.3 billion 30 and 7.25% of the
proceeds of a national settlement.331 As in the other settlements, there were
provisions to fund youth usage reduction programs, a voluntary ban on
outdoor advertising, industry support for tougher access laws, and attorney
fee arbitration.332 Texas Attorney General Dan Morales went further than
his colleagues, however, in allocating $1.2 billion of the settlement to
specific agencies, health care providers, orresearch organizations scattered
throughout the state.33 In that regard, he lived up to the public choice
expectations of a policy maker.334
D. Minnesota
Minnesota's attorney general was not happy with the national tobacco
settlement and asserted that it did not go far enough. 35 It is not surprising
then that the Minnesota Medicaid indemnity action, Minnesota v. Philip
Morris Inc.,336 was even more cantankerous than the previous actions in
other states.337 It was also the first time the opposing sides actually argued
328 Id.
329 Perez v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 967 F. Supp. 920, 927-29
(S.D. Tex. 1997) (limiting a claim for product liability and finding claims of
conspiracy, fraud and misrepresentation, and breach of implied warranty pre-
empted by federal law).
330 See Texas Deal Finalized; Payments Will Increase to $17.3 Billion, [12
Tobacco] Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Mealey Publications, Inc.) No. 7, at 8 (Aug. 6,
1998).
331 See Texas Settles Tobacco War for $15.3B, Feud Over Spoils Begins, [13
Tobacco Indus.] Andrews Litig. Rep. (Andrews Publications) No. 4, at 5 (Jan. 30,
1998).
332 See id. at 5-6.
333 See id. at 5.
31 See supra notes 56-67 and accompanying text.
331 See supra note 167 and accompanying text; see also Hubert Humphrey I,
Colloquy, 22 S. ILL. U.,L.J. 467, 475 (1998) (labelling the national settlement
proposal a "sweetheart deal" and "a compromise to public health").
336 Minnesota v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. CI-94-8565, 1998 WL 394331 (Minn.
Dist. Ct. May 18, 1998) (settlement agreement).
"37 See Industry Challenges Minn. Legislature's Refusal to Turn Over
Documents, [10 Tobacco] Mealey's Litig. Rep. (MealeyPublications, Inc.) No. 20,
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the merits of their case in court.338 The industry did not settle the suit until
after the defendant's closing arguments had been made and the case was
nearly ready to go to the jury.339 Another wrinkle to the Minnesota
litigation was the addition of Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Minnesota
("BCBSM") as a co-plaintiff.34 The industry opposed this arrangement
but was rebuffed by the trial court, and the appellate court refused to grant
an interlocutory review.341 The state claimed that it was entitled to $1.3
billion in damages, and BCBSM claimed additional damages of $460
million.
342
The industry took a novel but ultimately futile approach to the
Minnesota litigation. Throughout the discovery process, it requested
document production concerning the state legislature's enactment of
legislation regulating tobacco and gambling.343 The industry's theory was
that the legislature acted negligently in restricting tobacco usage.3 " If the
requested documents demonstrated that legislators were aware oftobacco's
adverse health risks, then they had a duty to make tougher laws to protect
public health.345 Similarly, if legislators were aware that tobacco was
addictive and wished to proceed against the industry on that basis, the
industry sought to determine why the legislature would promote state
action (the lottery) that promotes a different addiction (gambling).34 The
industry subsequently filed proposed court orders overruling the legisla-
at 15 (Feb. 20, 1997).
331 See Tobacco Executives Face Days of Questioning Over Past Company
Documents, [ 11 Tobacco] Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Mealey Publications, Inc.) No. 21,
at 3 (Mar. 5, 1998); Settlement Still Possible as Minnesota's Claims Are Given to
the Jury, [12 Tobacco] Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Mealey Publications, Inc.) No. 1, at
3 (May 7, 1998).
339 SeeMinnesota MayBeHappy, but theJurorsAren't, [12 Tobacco] Mealey's
Litig. Rep. (Mealey Publications, Inc.) No. 2, at 5 (May 21, 1998).
340 See Appellate Review of Insurer Standing in Minnesota Action Denied, [9
Tobacco] Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Mealey Publications, Inc.) No. 7, at 13 (Aug. 3,
1995).
341 See id.
342 See Tobacco Executives Face Days of Questioning over Past Company
Documents, supra note 338, at 3.
33 See Minn. Discovery Requests Center on Legislative, Settlement Policy
Documents, [10 Tobacco] Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Mealey Publications, Inc.) No. 13,
at 12 (Nov. 1, 1996).
3 See id.
345 See id.
346See id.
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ture's plea of privilege and immunity." The tobacco industry also took
issue with the application of a state law which required the companies to
make public record of certain ingredients used in their products, alleging
that ingredients are a federally protected trade secret. 8
The Minnesota settlement was valued at $6.6 billion with the state
claiming $6.1 billion and BCBSM receiving $469 million.3 49 The industry
agreed to spend $10 million over a ten-yearperiod to fund research relating
to underage usage of tobacco products, to maintain a publicly accessible
warehouse of internal documents, and to restrict advertising and
marketing. 50 At a post-settlement press conference with the jurors who
were almost asked to decide the case, it is unclear whether the tobacco
industry would have lost or would have suffered an excessive verdict.35'
E. Washington, Iowa, Indiana, and Other States
The settlements that tobacco reached with Mississippi, Florida, Texas,
and Minnesota were similar in several regards and served as models for
other settlements. Washington Attorney General Christine Gregoire
brokered a partial settlement with the smokeless tobacco companies.352
Under the terms of that agreement, the companies would pay the state's
legal fees, ban outdoor advertising, and support tougher state laws to ban
34 See Industry Challenges Minn. Legislature's Refiusal to Turn Over
Documents, supra note 337, at 15.
348 See Minnesota Sued by R.J Reynolds over New Tobacco Disclosure
Legislation, [11 Tobacco] Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Mealey Publications, Inc.) No. 4,
at 15 (June 19, 1997); see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 461.17 (West Supp. 1999)
(requiring tobacco manufacturers to identify the presence of ammonia,
formaldehyde, arsenic, cadmium, and lead).
141 See Tobacco Companies to Pay Minnesota, Blue Cross $6.6 Billion Plus
Fees, [12 Tobacco] Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Mealey Publications, Inc.) No. 2, at 3
(May 21, 1998). When Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Minnesota was awarded
proceeds from the settlement, it triggered a suit by policyholders who alleged that
their premiums had been artificially high when the insurer was unaware that it
would be indemnified under the settlement. See Minnesota Policyholders Sue for
Blue Cross Settlement Proceeds, [12 Tobacco] Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Mealey
Publications, Inc.) No. 2, at 6 (May 21, 1998).
350 See Tobacco Companies to Pay Minnesota, Blue Cross $6.6 Billion Plus
Fees, supra note 349, at 3.
351 See Minnesota May be Happy, but the Jurors Aren't, supra note 339, at 5.
352See Washington State Settles with TWo Tobacco Defendants, LIABILITYWK.,
Oct. 5, 1998, available in 1998 WL 12498712.
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vending machines.35 The initial victories, however, did not conclusively
establish that the states were invincible. The Iowa Supreme Court ruled in
State v. Philip Morris, Inc.,35 that the state's Medicaid indemnity claims
were "too remote" and upheld a lower court's grant of a motion to
dismiss.3 55 An Indiana judge reached the same conclusion.35 The industry
also enjoyed key successes in rulings on various motions in Alabama,
California, Florida, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Washington, and West
Virginia.35 7 These victories stemmed the momentum gained by the anti-
tobacco coalition and underscored the need for a brokered settlement.
IV. CONCLUSION
The tobacco industry stood on the edge of a great abyss in early 1997.
Litigation was threatening to bankrupt the corporations which legitimately
feared aggressive state attorneys general, tenacious health advocates, a
reenergized plaintiffs' bar, and an activist regulatory agency.35 8 Instead of
merely assuring survival, however, the industry set out to win. They would
agree, under the most unfavorable circumstances, to a settlement which
capped their future liability and offered a mechanism to pass along
associated costs of the settlement to consumers. 35 9 Alternatively, they set
out to preserve the status quo, if not to further increase their strategic
advantage. In pursuit of these objectives, the industry compromised when
necessary, exploited rifts among their opposition when possible, and
utilized the legislative process to bring about a favorable outcome.
36
0
By raising the stakes to an unprecedented degree, the industry skillfully
maneuveredthe anti-tobacco coalition into a position where it would defeat
itself3 61 Though speculative, the industry most likely had the influence to
prod the proposed national tobacco settlement through Congress amend-
ment free, but the proposal which failed in the Senate bore only a casual
353 See id.
'5 State ex rel. Miller v. Philip Morris, Inc., 577 N.W.2d 401 (Iowa 1998).
355 Id. at 406.
356 See Indiana Judge Dismisses State's Medicaid Complaint Against Tobacco
Industry, [7 Tobacco] Mealey's Litig. Rep. (Mealey Publications, Inc.) No. 7, at 7
(Aug. 6, 1998).
3
17 See Indiana's Tobacco Suit Dismissed; Industy Sees Some Daylight, INSIDE
HEALTH CARE REFORM, Aug. 3, 1998, available in 1998 WL 9893867.
35
1 See supra notes 161-92 and accompanying text.
359 See supra notes 142, 240-41 and accompanying text.
31 See supra notes 212-85 and accompanying text.
3' See supra notes 218-49 and accompanying text.
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resemblance to the agreement signed a year earlier.362 Supporters and
detractors alike were permitted to cannibalize the settlement to the point
that its demise would be certain.363 The tobacco companies meanwhile
settled independently with their most vocal critics and hinged the success
or failure of all remaining antagonists upon passage of fatally flawed
legislation.3" The legislative defeat was nefariously punctuated in the
minds of the defeated by the constant reminder that a majority of senators
favored the settlement.3 6 The tobacco industry consummated its public
policy coup by proposing a second, less punitive settlement directly to the
states, and by establishing an immediate deadline for ratification.3 s Faced
with the ultimate prisoner's dilemma, every state reluctantly acquiesced.367
This public policy outcome is predictable under the doctrine of public
choice theory. The more efficient and effective interest group, competing
in a market of intense conflict, utilized the strengths and faults of policy
makers to effectuate a favorable public policy outcome. Judging the
aggregate merit of this outcome will not be possible for decades to come
and will no doubt require the skills of learned historians and commentators.
With this as a prologue, we may engage today in the pursuit of public
policy more knowledgeable of its unyielding processes and more deferen-
tial to its capricious proclivities.
362 See supra notes 250-85 and accompanying text.
363 See supra notes 254-85 and accompanying text.
364 See supra notes 286-357 and accompanying text.
365 See 144 CONG. REC. S6479 (daily ed. June 17, 1998).
366 See Gail Gibson & Raja Mishra, Latest Tobacco Deal WouldLet Cigarette-
Makers Off Cheaper, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (Lexington, Ky.), Nov. 14,
1998, at Al.
367 See B&W Chairman Feels Confident, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER
(Lexington, Ky.), Nov. 22, 1998, at B4.
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APPENDIX 1
Distributed Costs
Concentrated Costs
Distributed Benefits
Y
4 4
Supply: With little to gain
and little to lose, policy
makers are likely to adopt
symbolic, position-taking
approaches to policy.
Demand: Little support or
opposition, but anyone
seeking to organize an
interest group faces
significant free-rider
problems.
Supply: Faced with a 'no-
win" situation, policy
makers are likely to
broadly outline a policy
but delegate the actual
details to another body
(i.e., executive department
or agency).
Demand: The majority
will rule to the extent the
minority or underlying
political structure will
allow. This is rarely more
than a temporary state.
Concentrated Benefits
Supply: Big potential
electoral benefits, with no
significant electoral costs;
self-regulation by interest
groups is sufficient.
Demand: Generally,
strong supporters facing
weak opposition win. Any
opposition faces significant
free-rider problems.
+
Supply: Faced with a "no-
win" situation, policy
makers are likely to
broadly outline a policy
but delegate the actual
details to another body
(i.e., executive department
or agency).
Demand: Interest groups
gain at the expense of
others. With zero-sum
solutions, competition is
fierce and conflict
dominates.
Adapted from: WILLIAMN. ESKRIDGE, JR. &PHILIPP. FRICKEY, LEGISLATION 55-56 (2d ed.
1995).
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APPENDIX 2
r r r
Settlement $3 $11.3 $17.3 $6.6 $2
Value Billion Billion Billion Billion Million
Ad/Marketing Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Restrictions
Underage Use Yes Yes Yes
Reduction
Programs
Attorney Submitted Submitted Submitted Paid for by
Fees to to to Settling
Arbitration Arbitration Arbitration Party
"Expedited Yes See
Appeal" Below
for Release of
Industry
Documents
Industry Yes Yes Industry Applies to
Support Cannot Vending
for Tougher Lobby Machine
Access Laws Against Laws Only
but May
Fight in
Court
Industry Added Added Added Yes Available as
Document After After After a Result of
Warehouse Minnesota Minnesota Minnesota Minnesota
Settlement Settlement Settlement Settlement
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